%0 Journal Article %A Hua HUANG %A HuiPing DING %T Environmental pollution control by a third party in coal-fired power plants %D 2019 %R 10.18402/resci.2019.02.11 %J Resources Science %P 326-337 %V 41 %N 2 %X

In China, coal-fired power plants still play a major role in the power sector, which is considered as a major emission source of air pollution, such as haze. Meanwhile, the concrete implementation path of the transformation of China’s environmental governance thinking from "who pollutes, who governs" to "who pollutes, who pays" is under way. Although the third party governance of environmental pollution has been popularized in air pollution prevention and control, there are also problems in existence. This study aims to take the flue gas control of coal-fired power industry as the research object. From the perspective of green supply chain, the mathematical models of coal-fired power plants using two modes of self-investment operation and third-party management under four kinds of regulatory constraints and policy incentives, including no subsidy, only electricity sales price subsidy, only extra sales volume ration of electricity are constructed, solved, and analyzed, respectively. Through the calculation and evaluation, the results show that: the simultaneous implementation of regulation and incentive policies can help coal-fired power plants upgrade to green power plants. Since less subsidies can help coal-fired power plants, the government is more inclined to formulate subsidy policies based on the third-party governance model. This model can also make more profits for coal-fired power plants and make the traditional environmental protection enterprises transform into productive service enterprises and obtain stable profits, which is helpful to popularize the idea of "who pollutes, who pays" in practice. As a green service provider, by devoting itself through innovating environmental technology to reduce pollutant emissions, the environmental protection enterprises can also assist the coal-fired power plants to gain additional sales volume of electricity and to maximize the supply chain’s profit as well. Therefore, it puts forward suggestions on strengthening the implementation and supervision of environmental restraint policies, giving precise incentive policies, and promulgating policies to encourage the improvement of environmental performance.

%U https://www.resci.cn/EN/10.18402/resci.2019.02.11