Resources Science ›› 2021, Vol. 43 ›› Issue (11): 2251-2263.doi: 10.18402/resci.2021.11.09

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Strategic behavior of heterogeneous coal-based enterprises under dual regulations

CHEN Yalin1(), LIU Jiaojiao1, WANG Xianjia2(), YU Rong1,3   

  1. 1. School of Management Science, Nanjing University of Finance and Economics, Nanjing 210023, China
    2. School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
    3. College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211106, China
  • Received:2020-08-28 Revised:2021-03-11 Online:2021-11-25 Published:2022-01-27
  • Contact: WANG Xianjia

Abstract:

Under the institutional framework of administrative regulation and water rights transaction, analyzing the different strategic behaviors of high-water consuming, coal-based enterprises is the basis for improving the efficiency of water resource governance. This article describes the interaction of the behaviors of endogenous coal-based enterprises by using the replication dynamic equation, which establishes an asymmetric evolutionary game model, and examines the change of behavior of enterprises. The theoretical analysis presents that there are three local asymptotically stable points in the behavioral change, which shows the following characteristics: when the punishment degree shifts from weak to strong, the behaviors of coal-based enterprises evolve from non-cooperation to cooperation; when punishment is between the extra income of coal-based enterprises from two different groups, different strategic behaviors occur. The calculation experiments and scenario simulation were designed based on different scenarios classified by the degree of punishment, which reveal that the change of expected utilities’ difference drives the differentiation of behavior; the degree of punishment drives the heterogeneous coal-based producers’ behavior to converge to different evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). If the initial probabilities of non-cooperation are beyond (0.50, 0.50), water rights transaction affects behavioral convergence rate and lacks effect on the trend of change. The results have some implications for water resources regulation in coal-rich areas: given the heterogeneities among coal-based producers, optimizing the punishment regulation is required, which contributes to a reasonable market concentration; within certain punishment range, regulation efficiency can be improved by adjusting the initial probability of non-cooperation and the cost caused by water rights transaction.

Key words: water resource regulation, coal-based enterprises, asymmetric evolutionary game, replication dynamic equation, computational experiment, simulation