基于“诊断—设计—结果”框架的农村宅基地退出模式原型分析

doi:10.18402/resci.2021.07.02

Abstract

Abstract:

Rural homestead withdrawal is a breakthrough in the reform of rural land system. It is essential to scientifically design homestead withdrawal models and effectively identify its operating mechanisms, in order to stimulate the vitality of rural development and optimize the allocation of urban and rural elements. Taking Shandong Province as an example and based on system theory to design four homestead withdrawal patterns, this study initially conceptualized the action for rural homestead withdrawal as the specific process by which diagnostic attributes, design attributes, and outcomes interact with each other. Therefore, a code-book was formed based on the diagnosis-design-outcome (DDO) framework. Second, the archetype analysis method was used to identify the action logic and operating mechanisms of different homestead withdrawal patterns. Finally, the applicable conditions of different withdrawal patterns were clarified according to some elements characterized by human-land relationship. The results show that: (1) The four homestead withdrawal models of asset exchange, monetary compensation, exchanging old-age service with homestead, and equity participation with homestead comprehensively consider the improvement of the rural living environment and the multi-level demands of farming households, and are characterized by the core-periphery spatial pattern, adapting to the needs of rural development in different regions. (2) The essence of different homestead withdrawal patterns is to guide farmers to exit in an orderly manner through a diversified incentive mechanism, showing many kinds of archetypes, such as the incentive of asset exchange under the guidance of the government, economic compensation incentive under the cooperation between the government and rural collectives, the incentive for exchanging old-age service with homestead under the cooperation of the government and enterprises, as well as the incentive for equity participation with homesteads under the collaboration of rural collectives and enterprises, and so on. Different homestead withdrawal patterns have differentiated operational processes and specific applicable conditions. Affected by differences in regional environments, policy-driven transformations, and the upgrading of farming households’ demand level, the withdrawal patterns of homesteads will be more diversified. In the process of dissemination and application, the models should be adjusted properly according to the differences and changes of system conditions, so as to meet the needs of rural homestead management and rural development in different areas.

Key words: diagnosis-design-outcome framework, rural homestead withdrawal, archetype analysis, pattern comparison, Shandong Province

QU Yanbo, CHAI Yifan, ZHU Weiya, PING Zongli, ZONG Haining, WANG Sen. Archetype analysis of rural homestead withdrawal patterns based on the framework of “diagnosis-design-outcome”[J].Resources Science, 2021, 43(7): 1293-1306.

Figures/Tables 12

Figure 1

Table 1

Types and basic features of homestead withdrawal patterns

标码	退出模式	基本内涵	外缘系统特征	内核系统特征
标码	退出模式	基本内涵	外缘系统特征	主导方与资金来源	退出后的安置区位	退出方式
a	资产置换	农户以退出的宅基地置换一定面积的社区安置房和城市商品房购置补贴,交换具体的物业持有或产权,解决退出后的住房难题,实现农村居住城市化	远离城镇的城郊村或郊外村居民点布局散乱,基础设施建设不足,人居环境相对陈旧,空心化相当严重,进城务工人口增多;纯农与一部分兼农农户基于住房需求,对优化人居环境及配套设施需求和进城购房安置意愿强烈	政府主导,地方财政	统建区位：原址、镇驻地、城区自建区位：原址/异址	为推动新社区集聚建设,鼓励农民市民化,地方政府主导整理拆迁,将农民原有宅基地指标转变为国有建设用地指标,同时统一规划建设安置小区,按照房地区位、状况等,对不愿离村的农户置换相应居住面积的住房,对进城入镇且有购房意愿的农户给予一次性购房补贴,通过分配安置房和给予商品房购置补贴等形式对农户进行实物补偿
b	货币补偿	按照退出补偿标准以货币的形式弥补农户因宅基地退出带来的损失,使其直接获得一次性的经济收入	城市建设用地紧缺地区农村宅基地长期无人居住,闲置浪费严重;迁入城镇居住的一部分兼农或非农农户基于经济需求希望通过宅基地获得一定的资金,提高当前生活水平	政府主导与村集体引导;资金由政府财政和村集体经济支出组成	自主选择,不参与统一安置	当地政府按照土地增减挂钩政策,对宅基地整理复垦,获取建设用地指标一部分保障优化村内基础设施等用地需求,节余的指标在县域、市域内安排使用,以建设用地指标基准交易价格获取有偿调剂使用费,同时根据房屋价值评估,对片区内自愿退出宅基地的村民提供价值不等的补偿
c	以地养老	农村老人用所拥有的闲置宅基地置换统一养老服务,在一定程度上缓解养老难题	具有区位优势的村庄宅基地超标占用、一户多宅等低效利用现象突出;退出农户中的年老夫妻独自在农村生活,子女在新的宅基地或城市居住,此类型家庭最基本的需求是养老	政企合作,资金主要来源于社会资本与政府资助	养老公寓	结合精准扶贫,首先通过政府引导对宅基地整理复垦,将部分指标用于产业用地,通过实施政企共建,按照“政府引导、企业投资、以人为本、合作共赢”的发展思路,允许资方直接使用宅基地退出腾退的土地指标,积极吸引社会资本参与建设高标准集中养老机构并配套相应基础设施,完善退地年老农户的入住条件
d	土地入股	农户以闲置宅基地入股参与分红,根据商业评估,收益按持股比例进行分配,充分调动退出积极性,提高宅基地利用效率,拓宽收入来源	适用于城市远郊或拥有优势资源的农村地区,具备商业开发潜质;兼业或非农型农户抗风险能力较强,行为认知高,精神性需求程度高且渴望获得更多的收入来源	村企合作,资金由企业投资与村级资金组成	自主选择,不参与统一安置	结合美丽乡村规划,村集体将入股的宅基地和房屋进行统一整理,经政府规划审批,由村企合作成立股份有限公司负责宅基地的统一开发和经营,按市场实际情况,所得营运利润在预留管理费用和发展费用的基础上按村民股份份额比例进行统一分红

Table 1

Figure 2

Table 2

Table 3

The coding manual for archetype analysis

代码	变量	基本描述	代码	变量	基本描述
R	宅基地特征		EM21	货币补偿	宅基地换一次性货币收入
R1	区位	宅基地所处地理区位	EM3	以地养老	宅基地换取养老服务,如老年公寓、养老金等
R11	城市近郊	处于城市近郊的农村宅基地	EM4	公平公正激励	参与农村宅基地退出的农户可实现决策参与与利润共享
R12	城市远郊	处于城市远郊的农村宅基地	EM41	土地入股	以闲置宅基地入股参与分红,农户根据商业评估获取收益分配
R2	资源	宅基地的资源禀赋	CM	控制机制	参与宅基地退出行动的控制主体
R21	禀赋品质	拥有特殊品质条件,如独特自然景观、丰富的旅游资源	CM1	政府	地方政府主导宅基地退出行动
R22	无禀赋优势	无特殊品质条件	CM2	企业	企业参与宅基地退出行动
R3	质量	宅基地的房屋结构	CM3	村集体	村集体引导宅基地退出行动
R31	结构以混凝为主	房屋结构质量相对稳固	DM	决策机制	宅基地退出行为决策形式
R32	结构多土木、砖木	房屋结构质量相对较差	DM1	分权	给予多数同意或一致同意原则决策
A	农户特征		DM11	有限参与	个别利益相关者参与决策
A1	类型	按收入来源及从事职业差异对受访农户进行分类	DM12	广泛参与	利益相关者均有机会参与决策过程
A11	纯农型	受访者仅从事农业生产活动,或其收入完全来源于种植、养殖等农业生产活动	DM2	集权	自上而下的层级式决策制定方式
A12	兼业型	受访者同时从事农业生产和非农生产活动,或其同时有农业和非农途径的收入	COM	协调机制	确保利益相关者可以充分表达自身诉求、平等协商、最终达成共识
A13	非农型	受访者仅从事非农生产活动,或其收入仅来源于非农生产活动,如务工收入、自主经营性收入或政府补贴等。	P	宅退后的规划	宅基地退出后的利用发展目标
A2	需求	有关农户对宅基地退出模式选择的驱动性需求	P1	旧村改造、新社区集聚建设	改善优化乡村人居环境、完善基础设施
A21	生活需求	农户退出后有关生活最基本的需要	P2	城乡建设用地指标挂钩	统筹城乡建设用地,破解城市空间发展难题
A211	住房需求	新住所或进城安置意愿	P3	乡村特色产业发展	助推美丽乡村建设
A212	经济需求	解决日常生活开销成本的需要	IM	信息机制	宅基地退出过程中的信息公开与披露机制
A22	安全需求	养老、教育、医疗与就业等基本社会保障需求	IM1	信息公开透明	宅基地退出的相关信息可以大范围传播和共享
A23	社交需求	情感、认同感和归属感的需要	CS	成本分担机制	宅基地退出行动的主要资金来源
A24	尊重需求	决策参与、意愿公平表达的需要	CS1	主导型	由参与主体独自承担退出行动的资金投入
A25	自我实现需求	土地发展权收益公正分配的需要	CS11	政府财政	地方政府财政扶持
A3	意愿	农户参与宅基地退出的积极程度	CS2	共担型	利益相关者在平等互利的基础上共同承担宅基地退出的成本
A31	积极退出	农户自愿有序参与退出宅基地	BS	收益分配机制	确定哪些主体可以在宅基地退出过程中获益
EM	激励机制	促使农户参与和同意宅基地退出	BS1	政府	政府在宅基地退出过程中受益
EM1	住房安置激励	参与农村宅基地退出的农户可获得住房形式的实物奖励或补贴	BS2	企业	企业在宅基地退出过程中获益,如获得用地指标、获取经营收益等
EM11	资产置换	宅基地换宅基地、社区安置房、城市商品房等	BS3	村集体	村集体在宅基地退出过程中获益,如提高集体地位、壮大集体经济等
EM12	购房补贴	宅基地换购房补贴	BS4	农户	农户在宅基地退出过程中获益,如取得退地补偿、满足各类需求等
EM2	经济利益激励	参与农村宅基地退出的农户可以获得货币形式的奖励	O O1	结果宅基地成功退出	试点地区宅基地有序退出,基本达到预期目标

Table 3

Figure 3

Table 4

Table 5

Table 6

Table 7

Figure 4

Table 8

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案例县市	案例村庄及代码	模式类型
临沂沂水县	桃棵子村（Obj1）、四门洞村（Obj2）	土地入股
青岛莱西市	刘家疃村（Obj3）	资产置换
滨州博兴县	寨韩村（Obj4）	以地养老
枣庄滕州市	上营村（Obj5）	货币补偿
济宁汶上县	庞楼村（Obj6）	土地入股
聊城茌平县	刘马村（Obj7）、薛店村（Obj8）	资产置换、以地养老
菏泽成武县	刘堂村（Obj9）	货币补偿
德州禹城市	杨桥村（Obj10）、郑牛村（Obj11）	资产置换、土地入股
德州武城县	党庄村（Obj12）	货币补偿

序号	（子）原型描述	（子）原型的代码组合	案例数量与对应代码
1	基于政府主导的资产置换激励满足农户住房需求	R22-A12-A211-EM11-CM1-COM-P1-BS4-O	3(Obj3、Obj7、Obj10)
1.1	城市远郊、纯农型、财政主导	R12-R22-A11-A12-A211-EM11-CM1-CS1-COM-P1-BS4-O	2(Obj3、Obj10)
1.2	集权	R22-A12-A211-EM11-CM1-DM2-COM-P1-BS4-O	2(Obj7、Obj10)

序号	（子）原型描述	（子）原型的代码组合	案例数量与对应代码
2	基于政村合作的货币补偿激励满足农户经济需求	R12-R22-A12-A212-EM21-CM1-CM3-P2-CS2-BS4-O	3(Obj5、Obj9、Obj12)
2.1	购房补贴、分权	R12-R22-A12-A212-EM21-EM12-CM1-CM3-DM1-P2-CS2-BS4-O	2(Obj9、Obj12)

序号	（子）原型描述	（子）原型的代码组合	案例数量与对应代码
3	基于政企合作的以地养老激励满足农户养老需求	R22-A11-A22-EM3-CM1-BS4-O	3(Obj4、Obj7、Obj8)
3.1	城市近郊	R11-R22-A11-A22-EM3-CM-BS4-O	2(Obj7、Obj8)
3.2	积极退出、企业参与、指标增减挂钩	R22-A11-A22-A31-EM3-CM1-CM2-P2-BS4-O	2(Obj4、Obj8)
3.3	分权、协调机制、成本共担	R22-A11-A22-EM3-CM1-DM1-COM-CS2-BS4-O	2(Obj4、Obj7)

序号	（子）原型描述	（子）原型的代码组合	案例数量与对应代码
4	基于村集体引导的土地入股激励满足农户收益分配公正需求	R21-A12-A25-EM41-CM3-P3-BS3-BS4-O	4(Obj1、Obj2、Obj6、Obj11)
4.1	非农、企业参与、分权、协调机制、成本共担	R21-A12-A13--A25-A31-EM41-CM2-CM3-DM1-COM-CS2-P3-BS3-BS4-O	3(Obj1、Obj2、Obj6)
4.2	城市远郊	R12-R21-R31--A12-A25-EM41-CM3-P3-BS3-BS4-O	2(Obj1、Obj2)

Archetype analysis of rural homestead withdrawal patterns based on the framework of “diagnosis-design-outcome”

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退出模式	方式	适用区域	模式功能	适用群体	需求满足	主导方	资金来源	实施动机	运行特点
宅基地置换	资产置换	远郊村	居住保障	纯农、兼业型	住房需求	政府	财政资金	旧村改造、新社区建设	行政力量
	货币补偿	远郊村	财产保障	兼业型	经济需求	政府+村集体	财政扶持+村集体经济	城乡建设用地统筹发展	多形式灵活运用
	以地养老	城乡结合部	社会保障	老年纯农型	养老需求	政府+企业	财政扶持+企业投资	精准扶贫	多主体间利益协调
开发经营	土地入股	城市远郊或具有商业开发潜质的村庄	收益分配保障	兼业、非农型	土地增值收益分配公平公正需求	企业+村集体	村集体经济+第三方资金	发展乡村特色产业	土地流转、市场交易

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