激励约束视角下中国碳市场的碳减排效应

doi:10.18402/resci.2022.09.02

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

碳排放权交易市场是中国实现碳达峰、碳中和的重要经济手段。为系统性探究碳市场的碳减排机制，本文聚焦于“两省五市”试点碳市场的政策差异性，利用2014—2020年市级数据，分别从激励机制和约束机制视角进行实证检验。研究表明：①就碳市场的激励机制而言，碳定价水平是影响碳市场碳减排效应的核心要素，碳市场的交易活动总体而言则没有显著影响；②然而，碳市场的交易活动对碳减排具有碳价格的门槛效应，当碳价达到一定水平后，碳价才会通过碳交易对碳减排发挥显著作用；③就碳市场的约束机制而言，约束性政策主要集中在碳市场的非交易环节，其中配额政策的碳减排效应显著，而监督、报告、核查政策（MRV）和惩罚政策尚未显现出对于碳减排的约束力。因此，为充分发挥碳市场的碳减排效应，建议引导碳市场形成能够反应碳减排成本的碳定价水平、尽快建立碳市场的最低限价制度、采取相对严格的碳配额核定方法等约束性政策。

关键词: 碳市场, 碳减排效应, 碳定价, 激励机制, 约束机制

Abstract:

The carbon emissions trading market is an important economic tool for China to achieve its carbon peaking and neutrality goals. To systematically explore the carbon market’s emission reduction mechanism, this study focused on the system differences between seven carbon markets located in two provinces and five cities in China. Using municipal data from 2014 to 2020, we empirically examined the incentive and constraint mechanisms of the carbon market. The results show that: (1) In terms of the incentives for emission trading systems, carbon price is the core element that affects the carbon abatement effect, while such effect does not mainly come from carbon allowance trading; (2) Carbon allowance trading has a carbon price threshold effect on carbon abatement; only when the carbon price reaches a certain level, it will reduce carbon emission through trading; (3) In terms of constraints, the binding policies mainly stay in the non-trading stages; quota allocation is the core policy in the process of decarbonization, while the constraints of measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) and punishment policy are not apparent yet. In conclusion, we recommend that: First, carbon emission trading should be encouraged to form a reasonable carbon price that can reflect the gradually increasing reduction costs of participating parties; Second, a floor price for the carbon allowance needs to be taken into consideration; Third, a relatively strict carbon quota allocation policy needs to be formulated.

Key words: emission trading system, carbon abatement effect, carbon pricing, incentive mechanism, constraint mechanism

张晗, 孟佶贤. 激励约束视角下中国碳市场的碳减排效应[J]. 资源科学, 2022, 44(9): 1759-1771.

ZHANG Han, MENG Jixian. Carbon emission abatement effect of China’s carbon market from the perspective of incentives and constraints[J]. Resources Science, 2022, 44(9): 1759-1771.

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变量类别	变量名称	变量单位	平均值	中位数	标准差	最小值	最大值
被解释变量	碳排放总量	百万t	45.288	22.795	51.061	4.710	237.900
	碳排放强度	t/万元	1.404	1.310	0.715	0.180	4.380
	人均碳排放	t/人	6.521	6.065	3.321	1.920	20.960
解释变量	碳价	元/t	24.140	21.919	12.322	4.495	87.125
解释变量	相对碳交易量	万t	127.275	82.551	159.043	2.326	1265.750
控制变量	实际人均GDP	万元/人	6.717	6.056	3.568	2.192	38.411
	产业结构	%	48.979	48.685	13.119	15.570	83.430
	人口规模	万人	599.876	415.405	568.130	110.200	3416.000
	授权专利数量	件	3835.647	245.500	9142.087	6.000	63266.000

变量	(1)	(2)	(3)
变量	碳总量	碳强度	人均碳排放
碳价	-0.050*(0.025)	-0.037*(0.016)	-0.075**(0.028)
控制变量	控制	控制	控制
时间固定效应	控制	控制	控制
地区固定效应	控制	控制	控制
常数项	6.342***(0.488)	1.692**(0.524)	9.054***(1.237)
R²	0.035	0.025	0.214
样本量	252	252	252

变量	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	碳总量	碳总量	碳总量	碳总量	碳总量	碳总量
	碳总量	碳总量	碳价≥ 24.14元		碳价< 24.14元
碳价×相对碳交易量	0.004 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.011)	-0.043 (0.079)	-0.157* (0.093)	0.091** (0.035)	0.102*** (0.033)
碳价	0.019 (0.029)	-0.013 (0.050)	0.475** (0.209)	0.345* (0.204)	0.068 (0.068)	0.064 (0.064)
相对碳交易量	0.026 (0.017)	0.026 (0.019)	0.170** (0.080)	0.268*** (0.087)	0.117*** (0.028)	0.123*** (0.027)
控制变量	未控制	控制	未控制	控制	未控制	控制
时间固定效应	控制	控制	控制	控制	控制	控制
地区固定效应	控制	控制	控制	控制	控制	控制
常数项	3.442*** (0.001)	5.958*** (1.243)	3.321*** (0.089)	9.221*** (2.738)	3.413*** (0.018)	9.708*** (1.773)
R²	0.023	0.054	0.145	0.313	0.139	0.278
样本量	252	252	94	94	158	158

变量	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
变量	碳总量	碳总量	碳总量	碳总量	碳总量	碳总量
配额政策×碳价	-0.018**(0.007)	-0.021*(0.010)
惩罚政策×碳价			0.102***(0.019)	0.075***(0.010)
MRV政策×碳价					0.121***(0.022)	0.099***(0.019)
碳价	-0.005(0.026)	-0.031(0.028)	-0.043(0.024)	-0.061**(0.023)	-0.049*(0.022)	-0.066**(0.021)
控制变量	控制	控制	控制	控制	控制	控制
时间固定效应	控制	控制	控制	控制	控制	控制
地区固定效应	控制	控制	控制	控制	控制	控制
常数项	3.470***(0.069)	6.357***(0.452)	3.441***(0.065)	5.828***(0.535)	3.437***(0.066)	5.706***(0.600)
R²	0.004	0.038	0.027	0.047	0.039	0.057
样本量	252	252	252	252	252	252

变量	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
变量	碳总量	碳总量	碳强度	碳强度	人均碳排放	人均碳排放
碳价	-0.054***(0.005)	-0.057***(0.005)	-0.033***(0.005)	-0.037***(0.005)	-0.036**(0.010)	-0.051***(0.005)
控制变量	未控制	控制	未控制	控制	未控制	控制
时间固定效应	控制	控制	控制	控制	控制	控制
地区固定效应	控制	控制	控制	控制	控制	控制
常数项	3.464***(0.014)	5.222***(1.027)	0.836***(0.016)	1.868(1.168)	2.030***(0.032)	9.238***(0.930)
R²	0.293	0.388	0.162	0.293	0.083	0.692
样本量	144	144	144	144	144	144