小麦最低收购价政策对化肥施用强度的影响——基于农地权属的调节效应

doi:10.18402/resci.2022.02.09

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

自2004年粮食购销市场全面放开以来,国家实施了以粮食最低收购价、临时收储为主要内容的粮食托市收购政策。与此同时,以化肥为代表的农业化学品,作为农业生产的重要投入要素,对农业经营活动的影响日益凸显。然而,不断增加的化肥投入在保证国家粮食安全的同时,也面临着盲目、过量施用而导致化肥施用强度过高的问题。因此,本文以粮食流通中的小麦最低收购价政策这一典型托市收购政策为例,探索政府托市收购对化肥施肥强度的影响。利用1994—2018年中国省级面板数据,在阐述小麦最低收购价政策运行机理的基础上,采用双重差分、三重差分、事件分析等估计方法,着重分析该政策实施如何影响小麦化肥施用强度的问题,并联系中国的农地制度背景,进一步分析农地权属构成对该政策实施效果产生的影响。结果表明：①小麦最低收购价政策促使种植户在增产的目的之下提高了化肥施用强度,且具有持续增强的动态效应;②同时,政策对化肥施用强度的影响受到了农地权属构成的调节,表现为自有农地比重增加会弱化政策提高化肥施用强度的效果,租赁农地比重增加会强化政策提高化肥施用强度的效果;③在这一调节作用之下,政策对化肥施用强度的影响与种植面积呈现出了U型关系。本文对粮食托市收购政策效应的评估和阐释,对探求农业经营规模背景之下协调中国粮食安全和生态环境安全,具有重要的现实意义。

关键词: 托市收购, 最低收购价政策, 化肥施用强度, 农地产权结构, 调节效应, 双重差分方法, 中国

Abstract:

Since China’s grain market opened up in 2004, the country implemented the minimum grain purchase price policy and contingency reserve policy as the main content of the grain purchase to support the market policy. Meanwhile, agricultural chemicals and chemical fertilizers in particular, as one of the important agricultural production inputs, increasingly influence the operation of agriculture. But excessive use of chemical fertilizers has led to various agricultural environment problems. Therefore, taking the wheat minimum purchase price policy in grain circulation as an example, this study explored the influence of government purchase policy on fertilizer application intensity. Using the provincial panel data in 1994-2018, this study examined the mechanism of wheat minimum purchase price policy operation based on the difference-in-differences (DID), difference-in-differences-in-differences (DDD), and event analysis methods and analyzed how the policy affects the intensity of fertilizer application in wheat production. The results show that: (1) The wheat minimum purchase price policy promoted the farmers to increase the fertilizer application intensity with the purpose of increasing yield and had a continuously increasing dynamic effect; (2) The effect of the policy on the intensity of chemical fertilizer application was moderated by the composition of farmland ownership. The effect of the policy on the intensity of chemical fertilizer application was weakened by the increase of the proportion of owned farmland and strengthened by the increase of the proportion of rented farmland. (3) Under such moderation, the policy’s influence on the intensity of fertilizer application and planting area revealed a U-shaped relationship. In the context of exploring the scale of agricultural operations to coordinate China’s food security and ecological environment protection, the evaluation and interpretation of the effects of minimum grain purchase price policy to support the market has important theoretical and practical significance.

Key words: purchase to support the market, minimum purchase price policy, chemical fertilizer application intensity, farmland property right composition, moderation effects, difference-in-differences method, China

高婧, 曹宝明, 李宁. 小麦最低收购价政策对化肥施用强度的影响——基于农地权属的调节效应[J]. 资源科学, 2022, 44(2): 320-333.

GAO Jing, CAO Baoming, LI Ning. Impact of the wheat minimum purchase price policy on chemical fertilizer application intensity: Based on the moderation effects of farmland property rights[J]. Resources Science, 2022, 44(2): 320-333.

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变量	定义与赋值	样本量	均值	标准差	最小值	最大值
化肥施用强度	单位面积化肥施用量/（kg/亩）	350	21.99	6.40	7.76	37.48
农村居民人均纯收入	上一年度农村居民人均纯收入/元	350	2881.00	1893.00	723.70	10747.00
单产	上一年度单位面积小麦产量/（kg/亩）	350	258.50	79.69	71.50	432.30
种子成本	单位面积小麦种子费用/（元/亩）	350	22.86	7.78	11.18	45.10
机械成本	单位面积小麦机械费用/（元/亩）	350	50.64	19.03	10.95	90.21
劳动力成本	单位面积小麦人工费用/（元/亩）	350	103.00	49.54	27.00	298.80
商品化率	上一年度单位面积小麦主产品出售比例/（%/亩）	350	53.88	21.40	11.50	100.00
成本利润率	小麦成本利润率/%	350	14.05	31.46	-55.18	126.90
化肥价格	化肥平均费用/（元/kg）	350	2.55	0.35	1.83	4.16
农药成本	单位面积小麦农药成本/（元/亩）	350	7.21	4.94	1.30	32.60
土地成本	单位面积土地总成本^(a)/（元/亩）	210	66.14	30.52	10.54	155.60
自有土地成本	单位面积自营土地折租/（元/亩）	210	61.48	25.75	10.54	130.80
租入土地成本	单位面积流转土地折租/（元/亩）	210	4.66	7.87	0.00	45.29
自有农地比重	自有土地成本/土地总成本×100%	210	94.47	6.67	66.08	100.00
租入农地比重	租入土地成本/土地总成本×100%	210	5.53	6.67	0.00	33.92
小麦播种面积	千hm²	350	4838.00	2378.00	717.90	11220.00
农作物播种面积中的小麦占比	小麦播种面积/农作物播种面积×100%	350	22.82	9.40	4.92	49.38
粮食作物播种面积中的小麦占比	小麦播种面积/粮食作物播种面积×100%	350	33.18	13.69	7.84	60.97

变量	化肥施用强度水平值					化肥施用强度对数值
变量	（1）	（2）	（3）	（4）	（5）	（6）
Policy	4.6324*** (0.6130)	-1.6240* (0.8465)	-0.0587 (0.5700)	1.9715** (0.9088)	1.9159** (0.8509)	0.0869** (0.0397)
控制变量	—	—	—	—	控制	控制
时间固定效应	—	—	—	控制	控制	控制
省份固定效应	—	—	控制	控制	控制	控制
省份时间趋势	—	控制	控制	控制	控制	控制
常数项	20.9620*** (0.3983)	17.3810*** (0.4818)	17.5152*** (0.2817)	15.8257*** (1.0843)	62.5000*** (18.2692)	4.9144*** (0.9095)
R²	0.0911	0.7450	0.8879	0.9127	0.9441	0.9467
观察值	350	350	350	350	336	336

变量	化肥施用强度	边际效应	化肥施用强度	边际效应
变量	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Policy	1.5880* (0.8987)	1.7803** (0.7724)	7.9019* (4.6724)	1.7843** (0.7731)
ratio_rentland	0.2600 (0.3035)		—
Policy ×ratio_rentland	0.1386** (0.0676)		—
ratio_selfland	—		-5.5267 (4.4166)
Policy ×ratio_selfland	—		-1.3427** (0.6671)
控制变量	控制		控制
时间固定效应	控制		控制
省份固定效应	控制		控制
省份时间趋势	控制		控制
常数项	70.3327*** (21.9990)		68.8026*** (21.4155)
R²	0.9285		0.9285
观测值	210		210

变量	水平值	对数值	水平值	对数值
变量	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Policy	65.4294* (38.4679)	3.2670* (1.7727)	158.5484* (93.5417)	8.7750** (4.3200)
Policy ×ln wheat_ratio_crops	-45.2958* (24.7346)	-2.2671** (1.1398)
ln wheat_ratio_crops	-17.6178* (10.1572)	-0.8295* (0.4681)
(ln wheat_ratio_crops)²	3.5948* (1.8755)	0.1645* (0.0864)
Policy ×（ln wheat_ratio_crops)²	7.8497** (3.9563)	0.3922** (0.1823)
Policy ×ln wheat_ratio_grain			-90.2029* (50.8279)	-4.9649** (2.3474)
ln wheat_ratio_grain			-17.9502* (10.3478)	-0.8935* (0.4779)
(ln wheat_ratio_grain)²			3.1374* (1.7143)	0.1502* (0.0792)
Policy ×(ln wheat_ratio_grain)²			12.8850* (6.8875)	0.7035** (0.3181)
控制变量	控制	控制	控制	控制
时间固定效应	控制	控制	控制	控制
省份固定效应	控制	控制	控制	控制
省份时间趋势	控制	控制	控制	控制
常数项	43.5057** (21.9646)	4.3440*** (1.0122)	46.4937 (33.6339)	4.5462*** (1.5533)
R²	0.9604	0.9606	0.9644	0.9644
观测值	210	210	210	210