资源科学 ›› 2022, Vol. 44 ›› Issue (1): 15-31.doi: 10.18402/resci.2022.01.02
收稿日期:
2021-03-10
修回日期:
2021-06-02
出版日期:
2022-01-25
发布日期:
2022-03-25
作者简介:
孙慧,女,江苏泗阳人,教授,研究方向为资源配置与可持续发展。E-mail: shuixju@qq.com
基金资助:
SUN Hui1,2(), WANG Hui1,2, XIAO Hanyue1,2, XIN Long1,2
Received:
2021-03-10
Revised:
2021-06-02
Online:
2022-01-25
Published:
2022-03-25
摘要:
政府主导、企业主体、公众参与的“多方联动”中国特色环境治理体系是增强环境主体履行责任、提升生态环境质量、助推经济高质量发展的重要途径。从异质型环境责任主体的内外部协同视角出发,基于2011—2017年中国31个省(区、市)宏观数据及A股1423家工业上市公司相关数据,采用高维固定效应模型探析“多方联动”的环境责任主体“提质”“减排”“增效”的协同治理效果;在环保督查力度持续攀升、环境污染治理行政规制适时调整的背景下,考察环境政策不确定性对于环境责任主体协同治理效果的调节效应。结果表明:①政府规制责任与公众监督责任的内部协同治理发挥显著“提质”效果,倒逼企业积极履行环境治理责任,提升环境责任意识,提高发展质量。②政府规制责任、企业环境责任、公众监督责任“多方联动”的外部协同治理发挥显著“减排”与“增效”作用,不仅降低地区污染排放水平,提高环境治理效率,而且显著提升地区绿色贡献水平,有效促进绿色高质量发展。③环境政策不确定性释放了因时、因地、因事精准施策、适时调整、高效匹配的信号,有效提升了“多方联动”的外部协同治理效果。本文对于加快完善多方协同共治的环境治理机制、推动经济与环境激励相容发展具有重要的现实意义。
孙慧, 王慧, 肖涵月, 辛龙. 异质型责任主体的环境协同治理效果[J]. 资源科学, 2022, 44(1): 15-31.
SUN Hui, WANG Hui, XIAO Hanyue, XIN Long. Environmental collaborative governance effect of heterogeneous responsible subjects[J]. Resources Science, 2022, 44(1): 15-31.
表1
环境责任主体参与环境治理的政策演进
政策阶段 | 发布年份 | 政策名称 | 政策措施 |
---|---|---|---|
一元管理 2008年以前 | 2007 | 《国家环境与健康行动计划》 | 发挥政府的组织和领导作用,建立环境与健康工作协作机制,制定促进环境与健康工作协调开展的相关制度和环境污染健康危害风险评估制度 |
2008 | 《中国应对气候变化的政策与行动(2008)白皮书》 | 强化冶金、建材、化工等产业政策,控制工业生产过程的温室气体排放;到2010年,力争使工业生产过程的氧化亚氮排放稳定在2005年的水平 | |
二元治理 2009—2014年 | 2009 | 《整治违法排污企业保障群众健康环保专项行动》 | 加强对“两高一资”行业重污染企业监督检查;对涉砷行业(硫化物、磷矿开采、选矿、冶炼;硫化工;磷化工;砷化物生产)企业进行全面清理 |
2013 | 《大气污染防治行动计划》 | 本着“谁污染、谁负责,多排放、多负担,节能减排得收益、获补偿”的原则,积极推行激励与约束并举的节能减排新机制 | |
多方联动 2015—2020年 | 2015 | 《中华人民共和国环境保护法》 | 明确规定政府、企业和公众是环境治理体系中的3个主要参与者 |
2015 | 《关于加快推进生态文明建设的意见》 | 鼓励公众积极参与;完善公众参与制度,及时准确披露各类环境信息,维护公众环境权益 | |
2015 | 《环境保护公众参与办法》 | 保障公民、法人和其他组织获取环境信息、参与和监督环境保护的权利 | |
2017 | 《党的十九大报告》 | 构建以政府为主导、企业为主体、社会组织和公众共同参与的环境治理体系 | |
2020 | 《关于构建现代环境治理体系的指导意见》 | 构建党委领导、政府主导、企业主体、社会组织和公众共同参与的现代环境治理体系 |
表2
变量的描述性统计与相关性系数
变量属性 | 变量名称 | 变量符号/单位 | 均值 | 标准差 | 最小值 | 最大值 | 样本量 | VIF |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
被解释变量 | ||||||||
企业环境责任 | CER/分 | 0.433 | 1.011 | 0.000 | 3.434 | 9961 | - | |
地区污染水平 | AS/t | 3.802 | 0.980 | -1.050 | 5.208 | 9961 | - | |
WASTE/t | 12.658 | 0.771 | 8.441 | 13.752 | 9961 | - | ||
SW/t | 8.792 | 0.941 | 5.708 | 10.727 | 9961 | - | ||
地区绿色贡献水平 | AGC | 2.531 | 2.646 | 0.176 | 17.525 | 9961 | - | |
WGC | 1.104 | 0.250 | 0.673 | 2.269 | 9961 | - | ||
SGC | 3.674 | 3.355 | 0.073 | 17.827 | 9961 | - | ||
解释变量 | ||||||||
政府规制责任 | GR/项 | 3.298 | 0.726 | 0.000 | 4.868 | 9961 | 1.66 | |
企业环境责任 | CER/分 | 0.433 | 1.011 | 0.000 | 3.434 | 9961 | 1.14 | |
公众监督责任 | PR/条 | 1.533 | 0.116 | 0.790 | 1.688 | 9961 | 2.09 | |
控制变量 | ||||||||
省际 | 经济发展 | PGDP/(元/人) | 4.767 | 0.178 | 4.215 | 5.111 | 9961 | 6.12 |
对外贸易 | FDI/% | 2.656 | 1.343 | 0.040 | 8.313 | 9961 | 1.57 | |
人口密度 | POP/(人/km2) | 0.086 | 0.140 | 0.000 | 1.230 | 9961 | 1.62 | |
地方政府竞争 | FC/% | 1.765 | 0.195 | 0.972 | 2.151 | 9961 | 3.01 | |
TC/% | 0.971 | 0.149 | 0.668 | 1.350 | 9961 | 4.00 | ||
产业结构 | IS/% | 1.641 | 0.104 | 1.279 | 1.771 | 9961 | 3.03 | |
城镇化率 | UR/% | 1.786 | 0.092 | 1.356 | 1.952 | 9961 | 8.53 | |
企业 | 企业规模 | EM/人 | 3.389 | 0.521 | 1.415 | 5.743 | 9961 | 3.32 |
ASSET/万元 | 9.583 | 0.551 | 8.068 | 12.381 | 9961 | 6.68 | ||
企业年龄 | AGE/年 | 1.191 | 0.145 | 0.000 | 1.792 | 9961 | 1.18 | |
股权结构 | SS/% | 1.508 | 0.203 | 0.530 | 1.996 | 9961 | 1.09 | |
盈利能力 | ROA/% | 0.730 | 0.389 | -4.000 | 1.889 | 9961 | 1.06 | |
偿债能力 | LEV/% | 1.530 | 0.283 | -0.150 | 2.099 | 9961 | 1.43 | |
成长能力 | GA/% | 1.109 | 0.535 | -2.796 | 3.918 | 9961 | 1.07 | |
资产结构 | IAR/% | 8.098 | 0.810 | 0.000 | 10.987 | 9961 | 1.86 | |
FAR/% | 8.876 | 0.676 | 5.901 | 11.865 | 9961 | 5.31 |
表3
政府规制责任、公众监督责任对企业环境责任的内部协同“提质”效果
变量 | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
政府规制责任(GR) | 0.017*** | 0.016*** | 0.006 | 0.017*** | 0.016*** | 0.006 | ||
(0.003) | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.006) | |||
公众监督责任(PR) | 0.544** | 0.516** | 0.474* | 0.560** | 0.532* | 0.491* | ||
(0.228) | (0.228) | (0.243) | (0.277) | (0.276) | (0.291) | |||
政府规制责任×公众监督责任(GR×PR) | 0.014*** | 0.014** | ||||||
(0.006) | (0.006) | |||||||
经济发展(PGDP) | -1.207 | -0.056 | -0.549 | 1.729 | -1.188 | -0.014 | -0.505 | 1.872 |
(3.032) | (3.048) | (3.046) | (3.522) | (3.394) | (3.419) | (3.421) | (4.067) | |
对外贸易(FDI) | -0.398*** | -0.408*** | -0.400*** | -0.423*** | -0.394*** | -0.404*** | -0.395*** | -0.415*** |
(0.071) | (0.071) | (0.071) | (0.079) | (0.077) | (0.077) | (0.077) | (0.084) | |
人口密度(POP) | 1.317*** | 1.437*** | 1.346*** | 7.846 | 1.295* | 1.416** | 1.326** | 7.738* |
(0.469) | (0.469) | (0.469) | (5.978) | (0.676) | (0.676) | (0.676) | (4.690) | |
地方财政竞争(FC) | 0.377 | 0.379 | 0.395 | 0.867 | 0.394 | 0.397 | 0.412 | 0.854 |
(0.678) | (0.679) | (0.678) | (0.719) | (0.635) | (0.637) | (0.636) | (0.693) | |
地方税收竞争(TC) | 5.781*** | 5.558*** | 5.485*** | 4.885** | 5.528*** | 5.297** | 5.224** | 4.650** |
(1.769) | (1.776) | (1.774) | (1.963) | (2.107) | (2.110) | (2.106) | (2.293) | |
产业结构(IS) | -0.807 | 0.163 | -2.430 | -1.778 | -0.047 | 0.867 | -1.738 | -1.232 |
(3.829) | (3.864) | (3.894) | (4.829) | (4.749) | (4.801) | (4.861) | (6.189) | |
城镇化率(UR) | 8.627* | 10.152* | 11.079** | 14.539** | 8.551 | 10.155 | 11.074 | 14.003 |
(5.167) | (5.282) | (5.278) | (6.824) | (6.694) | (6.829) | (6.828) | (9.225) | |
企业年龄(AGE) | 7.628*** | 7.623*** | 7.516*** | 8.108** | 1.504*** | 1.506*** | 1.502*** | 1.442*** |
(2.217) | (2.220) | (2.218) | (3.177) | (0.403) | (0.403) | (0.403) | (0.455) | |
员工数量(EM) | -0.490 | -0.481 | -0.472 | -0.297 | 2.522*** | 0.301 | 0.303 | 0.416** |
(0.394) | (0.395) | (0.394) | (0.483) | (0.265) | (0.196) | (0.196) | (0.212) | |
资产总额(ASSET) | 2.541*** | 2.535*** | 2.528*** | 2.362*** | 2.503*** | 2.498*** | 2.501*** | 2.322*** |
(0.469) | (0.470) | (0.469) | (0.563) | (0.251) | (0.252) | (0.252) | (0.278) | |
盈利能力(ROA) | 0.309* | 0.302* | 0.303* | 0.335* | 0.410*** | 0.406*** | 0.407*** | 0.393*** |
(0.163) | (0.163) | (0.169) | (0.182) | (0.142) | (0.143) | (0.142) | (0.153) | |
偿债能力(LEV) | 0.568 | 0.564 | 0.565 | 0.415 | -0.991*** | -0.993*** | -0.992*** | -1.186*** |
(0.352) | (0.352) | (0.352) | (0.429) | (0.209) | (0.209) | (0.209) | (0.233) | |
成长能力(GA) | 0.066 | 0.072 | 0.067 | 0.024 | -0.086 | -0.082 | -0.086 | -1.107 |
(0.096) | (0.096) | (0.096) | (0.104) | (0.106) | (0.106) | (0.106) | (0.113) | |
股权结构(SS) | -1.129* | -1.093 | -1.124* | -1.063 | -0.835*** | -0.830*** | -0.834*** | -0.760*** |
(0.665) | (0.666) | (0.665) | (0.737) | (0.277) | (0.277) | (0.277) | (0.295) | |
无形资产占比(IAR) | -0.247* | -0.249* | -0.245* | -0.211 | -0.308** | -0.308** | -0.307** | -0.336** |
(0.131) | (0.131) | (0.131) | (0.170) | (0.121) | (0.122) | (0.122) | (0.174) | |
固定资产占比(FAR) | 0.566* | 0.577* | 0.556* | 0.464 | 1.147*** | 1.150*** | 1.144*** | 0.981*** |
(0.302) | (0.302) | (0.302) | (0.351) | (0.185) | (0.185) | (0.185) | (0.200) | |
常数项 | -43.477*** | -55.070*** | -49.995*** | -64.577*** | -44.665*** | -56.452*** | -51.839*** | -46.065*** |
(14.173) | (14.442) | (14.459) | (18.870) | (17.228) | (17.661) | (17.692) | (23.793) | |
年份固定 | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
个体固定 | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | N | N | N |
地区固定 | N | N | N | N | Y | Y | Y | Y |
行业固定 | N | N | N | N | Y | Y | Y | Y |
观测值 | 9961 | 9961 | 9961 | 9961 | 9961 | 9961 | 9961 | 9961 |
调整R2 | 0.137 | 0.135 | 0.138 | 0.143 | 0.202 | 0.201 | 0.202 | 0.190 |
F检验 | 58.91*** | 57.95*** | 56.69*** | 49.46** | 49.90*** | 49.03*** | 47.38*** | 30.30*** |
表4
不同环境责任主体对地区污染水平的协同“减排”效果
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
AS | WASTE | SW | AS | WASTE | SW | |
政府规制责任(GR) | 0.019*** | -0.009*** | 0.045*** | 0.020*** | -0.009*** | 0.045*** |
(0.001) | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | |
公众监督责任(PR) | 0.110*** | 0.105*** | 0.242*** | 0.114*** | 0.105*** | 0.242*** |
(0.027) | (0.012) | (0.022) | (0.022) | (0.011) | (0.031) | |
企业环境责任(CER) | 0.011*** | 0.001 | 0.006*** | 0.007*** | 0.001 | 0.003** |
(0.002) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
政府规制责任×公众监督责任×企业环境责任(GR×PR×CER) | -0.147*** | -0.027*** | -0.042*** | -0.095*** | -0.017*** | -0.028*** |
(0.019) | (0.008) | (0.015) | (0.017) | (0.006) | (0.011) | |
政府规制责任×公众监督责任(GR×PR) | -0.026 | -0.134*** | 0.236*** | -0.020 | -0.136*** | 0.238*** |
(0.030) | (0.013) | (0.024) | (0.025) | (0.013) | (0.024) | |
政府规制责任×企业环境责任(GR×CER) | -0.009*** | 0.001 | -0.002 | -0.005*** | 0.001 | -0.001 |
(0.003) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.002) | |
公众监督责任×企业环境责任(PR×CER) | -0.001 | 0.027*** | 0.008 | -0.004 | 0.015** | 0.004 |
(0.018) | (0.008) | (0.015) | (0.014) | (0.006) | (0.013) | |
控制变量 | 控制 | 控制 | 控制 | 控制 | 控制 | 控制 |
常数项 | 0.671 | 8.349*** | 3.499*** | 0.230 | 8.336*** | 3.164*** |
(0.428) | (0.188) | (0.352) | (0.514) | (0.222) | (0.369) | |
年份固定 | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
个体固定 | Y | Y | Y | N | N | N |
地区固定 | N | N | N | Y | Y | Y |
行业固定 | N | N | N | Y | Y | Y |
观测值 | 9961 | 9961 | 9961 | 9961 | 9961 | 9961 |
调整R2 | 0.930 | 0.341 | 0.297 | 0.986 | 0.996 | 0.989 |
F检验 | 3899.14*** | 152.02*** | 124.14*** | 170.33*** | 52.36*** | 320.37*** |
表5
不同环境责任主体对地区绿色贡献水平的协同“增效”作用
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
AGC | WGC | SGC | AGC | WGC | SGC | |
政府规制责任(GR) | -0.106*** | -0.001 | -0.169*** | -0.118*** | -0.001 | -0.173*** |
(0.028) | (0.002) | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.003) | (0.018) | |
公众监督责任(PR) | -1.170*** | -0.063*** | 0.992*** | -1.207*** | -0.061*** | 0.989*** |
(0.188) | (0.013) | (0.138) | (0.1532) | (0.013) | (0.125) | |
企业环境责任(CER) | -0.052*** | -0.001 | -0.011 | -0.035*** | -0.001 | -0.007 |
(0.014) | (0.001) | (0.011) | (0.007) | (0.001) | (0.008) | |
政府规制责任×公众监督责任×企业环境责任(GR×PR×CER) | 0.958*** | 0.025*** | 0.225** | 0.605*** | 0.015** | 0.130* |
(0.132) | (0.009) | (0.097) | (0.091) | (0.007) | (0.077) | |
政府规制责任×公众监督责任(GR×PR) | -1.165*** | 0.124*** | -2.936*** | -1.221*** | 0.125*** | -2.987*** |
(0.208) | (0.014) | (0.153) | (0.156) | (0.013) | (0.157) | |
政府规制责任×企业环境责任(GR×CER) | 0.087*** | 0.001 | 0.058*** | 0.052*** | 0.001 | 0.035** |
(0.019) | (0.001) | (0.014) | (0.010) | (0.001) | (0.017) | |
公众监督责任×企业环境责任(PR×CER) | 0.077 | -0.037*** | 0.157* | 0.042 | -0.023*** | 0.074 |
(0.124) | (0.008) | (0.092) | (0.064) | (0.007) | (0.071) | |
控制变量 | 控制 | 控制 | 控制 | 控制 | 控制 | 控制 |
常数项 | -3.600 | -6.483*** | 35.170*** | -4.126 | -6.652*** | 38.367*** |
(3.012) | (0.204) | (2.216) | (3.445) | (0.278) | (2.343) | |
年份固定 | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
个体固定 | Y | Y | Y | N | N | N |
地区固定 | N | N | N | Y | Y | Y |
行业固定 | N | N | N | Y | Y | Y |
观测值 | 9961 | 9961 | 9961 | 9961 | 9961 | 9961 |
调整R2 | 0.624 | 0.419 | 0.574 | 0.904 | 0.951 | 0.967 |
F检验 | 485.84*** | 211.15*** | 395.39*** | 279.69*** | 187.17*** | 484.03*** |
表6
不同环境责任主体协同“减排”“增效”的内生性检验
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
AS | WASTE | SW | AGC | WGC | SGC | |
SO2排放量滞后项(L.AS) | 1.025* | |||||
(0.556) | ||||||
废水排放量滞后项(L.SW) | 0.748 | |||||
(0.771) | ||||||
固废排放量滞后项(L.WASTE) | 0.153 | |||||
(0.731) | ||||||
SO2绿色贡献指数滞后项(L.AGC) | 1.730 | |||||
(2.003) | ||||||
固废绿色贡献指数滞后项(L.SGC) | -0.336 | |||||
(0.771) | ||||||
废水绿色贡献指数滞后项(L.WGC) | -0.510 | |||||
(0.743) | ||||||
政府规制责任×公众监督责任×企业环境责任(GR×PR×CER) | -0.264** | -48.350 | -61.420* | 0.015* | 0.001 | 0.012 |
(0.132) | (218.592) | (34.454) | (0.036) | (0.001) | (0.027) | |
控制变量 | 控制 | 控制 | 控制 | 控制 | 控制 | 控制 |
常数项 | -2135.336 | 1.2785e+08** | 1320652.347 | 490.904 | 15.291 | 1759.524* |
(8896.918) | (5.3450e+07) | (1866786.130) | (905.242) | (92.754) | (1051.214) | |
AR1 | -2.16** [0.031] | -1.87* [0.062] | -1.90* [0.058] | -0.69 [0.489] | -1.17 [0.242] | -1.43 [0.154] |
AR2 | -1.02 [0.307] | -0.33 [0.742] | -0.95 [0.340] | -0.99 [0.320] | -1.33 [0.182] | -1.14 [0.256] |
Sagan检验 | 9.61 [0.475] | 6.75 [0.240] | 2.02 [0.846] | 6.05 [0.109] | 0.61 [0.894] | 0.16 [0.984] |
Hansen检验 | 8.24 [0.606] | 4.19 [0.522] | 1.13 [0.951] | 4.10 [0.251] | 0.51 [0.917] | 0.13 [0.988] |
观测值 | 8538 | 8538 | 8538 | 8538 | 8538 | 8538 |
表7
环境政策不确定性的调节效应
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
AS | WASTE | SW | AGC | WGC | SGC | |
环境政策不确定性×(政府规制责任×公众监督责任×企业环境责任) (EPU×(GR×PR×CER)) | -0.257 | 0.010 | -0.170* | 4.196*** | 0.036 | 1.659*** |
(0.227) | (0.054) | (0.091) | (1.436) | (0.057) | (0.376) | |
政府规制责任×公众监督责任×企业环境责任 (GR×PR×CER) | -0.071*** | -0.024*** | -0.025** | 0.479*** | 0.024*** | 0.030 |
(0.021) | (0.006) | (0.001) | (0.121) | (0.006) | (0.060) | |
控制变量 | 控制 | 控制 | 控制 | 控制 | 控制 | 控制 |
常数项 | 0.036 | 8.176*** | 3.717*** | -8.079** | -6.325*** | 32.919*** |
(0.507) | (0.221) | (0.384) | (3.455) | (0.270) | (2.431) | |
年份固定 | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
个体固定 | Y | Y | Y | N | N | N |
地区固定 | N | N | N | Y | Y | Y |
行业固定 | N | N | N | Y | Y | Y |
观测值 | 9961 | 9961 | 9961 | 9961 | 9961 | 9961 |
调整R2 | 0.986 | 0.996 | 0.989 | 0.903 | 0.950 | 0.966 |
F检验 | 91.14*** | 36.30*** | 437.75*** | 231.48*** | 418.84*** | 341.75*** |
[1] | 孙前路, 房可欣, 刘天平. 社会规范、社会监督对农村人居环境整治参与意愿与行为的影响: 基于广义连续比模型的实证分析[J]. 资源科学, 2020,42(12):2354-2369. |
[ Sun Q L, Fang K X, Liu T P. Impact of social norms and public supervision on the willingness and behavior of farming households to participate in rural living environment improvement: Empirical analysis based on generalized continuous ratio model[J]. Resources Science, 2020,42(12):2354-2369.] | |
[2] | 何英, 鄢斌. 环境行政权与公民环境权的分立与协同[J]. 中国地质大学学报(社会科学版), 2003,3(5):82-85. |
[ He Y, Yan B. Discussion on the legislation and cooperation of environment administrative power and public’s environment rights[J]. Journal of China University of Geosciences (Social Sciences Edition), 2003,3(5):82-85.] | |
[3] | Haken H. Intelligent Behavior: A Synergetic View[M]. Germany: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd, 2003. |
[4] | Defarges P M. La Governance[M]. Japan: Que sais-je, 2003. |
[5] | 郑巧, 肖文涛. 协同治理: 服务型政府的治道逻辑[J]. 中国行政管理, 2008, (7):48-53. |
[ Zheng Q, Xiao W T. Synergetic governance: A new logic of service-oriented government[J]. China Administration, 2008, (7):48-53.] | |
[6] | Ren S G, Wei W J, Sun H L, et al. Can mandatory environmental information disclosure achieve a win-win for a firm’s environmental and economic performance?[J]. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2020, DOI: 10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.119530. |
[7] | Helfaya A, Whittington M. Does designing environmental sustainability disclosure quality measures make a difference?[J]. Business Strategy and the Environment, 2019,28(4):525-541. |
[8] | 陈璇, 钱维. 新《环保法》对企业环境信息披露质量的影响分析[J]. 中国人口·资源与环境, 2018,28(12):76-86. |
[ Chen X, Qian W. Effects of the new environmental protection law on the quality of companies’ environmental information disclosure[J]. China Population, Resources and Environment, 2018,28(12):76-86.] | |
[9] | Luo W B, Guo X X, Zhong S H, et al. Environmental information disclosure quality, media attention and debt financing costs: Evidence from Chinese heavy polluting listed companies[J]. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2019,231:268-277. |
[10] | 张正勇, 段咏雪. 政府监管、经营开放性与企业环境信息披露: 基于我国重污染行业的实证分析[J]. 南京财经大学学报, 2019, (1):78-87. |
[ Zhang Z Y, Duan Y X. Government supervision, openness of economy, and environmental information disclosure: Empirical analysis of highly polluted industry in China[J]. Journal of Nanjing University of Finance and Economics, 2019, (1):78-87.] | |
[11] | Shahab Y, Ntim C G, Chen Y, et al. Chief executive officer attributes, sustainable performance, environmental performance, and environmental reporting: New insights from upper echelons perspective[J]. Business Strategy and the Environment, 2020,29(1):1-16. |
[12] | 程宏伟, 胡栩铭. 生态问责制度对政商关系转型的影响分析[J]. 中国人口·资源与环境, 2020,30(9):164-176. |
[ Cheng H W, Hu X M. The impact of ecological accountability on the transformation of government-business relationship[J]. China Population, Resources and Environment, 2020,30(9):164-176.] | |
[13] | Zhao Y H, Zhang X L, Wang Y. Evaluating the effects of campaign-style environmental governance: Evidence from Environmental Protection Interview in China[J]. Environmental Science and Pollution Research, 2020, DOI: 10.1007/s11356-020-09243-9. |
[14] | 于连超, 张卫国, 毕茜, 等. 政府环境审计会提高企业环境绩效吗?[J]. 审计与经济研究, 2020,35(1):41-50. |
[ Yu L C, Zhang W G, Bi Q, et al. Can government environmental audit improve corporate environmental performance?[J]. Journal of Audit & Economics, 2020,35(1):41-50.] | |
[15] | Guo A F, Bai Y C. The role of public participation in environmental governance: Empirical evidence from China[J]. Sustainability, 2019,11(17):4696-4696. |
[16] | 郭进, 徐盈之. 公众参与环境治理的逻辑、路径与效应[J]. 资源科学, 2020,42(7):1372-1383. |
[ Guo J, Xu Y Z. The logics, paths, and effects of public participation in environmental management[J]. Resources Science, 2020,42(7):1372-1383.] | |
[17] | Du Y, Li Z Y, Du J, et al. Public environmental appeal and innovation of heavy-polluting enterprises[J]. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2019,222:1009-1022. |
[18] | Pang R, Zheng D, Shi M J. Agglomeration externalities and the non linear performance of environmental regulation: Evidence from China[J]. Growth and Change, 2021,52(3):1701-1731. |
[19] | Peng B H, Sheng X, Wei G. Does environmental protection promote economic development? From the perspective of coupling coordination between environmental protection and economic development[J]. Environmental Science and Pollution Research, 2020,27(31):39135-39148. |
[20] | Wu L H, Ma T S, Bian Y, et al. Improvement of regional environmental quality: Government environmental governance and public participation[J]. Science of the Total Environment, 2020, DOI: 10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.137265. |
[21] | Chen J D, Xu Y Q. Why do authoritarian regimes allow citizens to voice opinions publicly?[J]. The Journal of Politics, 2017,79(3):792-803. |
[22] | Xu J, Wei J C, Lu L D. Strategic stakeholder management, environmental corporate social responsibility engagement, and financial performance of stigmatized firms derived from Chinese special environmental policy[J]. Business Strategy and the Environment, 2019,28(6):1027-1044. |
[23] | Wu W W, Liang Z, Zhang Q. Effects of corporate environmental responsibility strength and concern on innovation performance: The moderating role of firm visibility[J]. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, 2020,27(3):1487-1497. |
[24] | Liao X C, Shi X P. Public appeal, environmental regulation and green investment: Evidence from China[J]. Energy Policy, 2018,119(8):554-562. |
[25] | Duan X, Dai S L, Yang R, et al. Environmental collaborative governance degree of government, corporation and public[J]. Sustainability, 2020,12(3):1138. |
[26] | Chen X H, Zhang J F, Zeng H X. Is corporate environmental responsibility synergistic with governmental environmental responsibility? Evidence from China[J]. Business Strategy and the Environment, 2020,29(8):3669-3686. |
[27] | 郑思齐, 万广华, 孙伟增, 等. 公众诉求与城市环境治理[J]. 管理世界, 2013, (6):72-84. |
[ Zheng S Q, Wan G H, Sun W Z, et al. Public demands and urban environmental governance[J]. Management World, 2013, (6):72-84.] | |
[28] | 郭建斌, 陈富良. 地方政府竞争、环境规制与城市群绿色发展[J]. 经济问题探索, 2021, (1):113-123. |
[ Guo J B, Chen F L. Local government competition,environmental regulation and green development of urban agglomeration[J]. Inquiry into Economic Issues, 2021, (1):113-123.] | |
[29] | 董直庆, 王辉. 环境规制的“本地-邻地”绿色技术进步效应[J]. 中国工业经济, 2019, (1):100-118. |
[ Dong Z Q, Wang H. Local-neighborhood effect of green technology of environmental regulation[J]. China Industrial Economics, 2019, (1):100-118.] | |
[30] | 范子英, 赵仁杰. 法治强化能够促进污染治理吗: 来自环保法庭设立的证据[J]. 经济研究, 2019,54(3):21-37. |
[ Fan Z Y, Zhao R J. Does rule of law promote pollution control: Evidence from the establishment of the environmental court[J]. Economic Research Journal, 2019,54(3):21-37.] | |
[31] | Schaeffer Y, Tivadar M. Measuring environmental inequalities: Insights from the residential segregation literature[J]. Ecological Economics, 2019, DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2019.05.009. |
[32] | 尹晶晶, 杨德刚, 霍金炜, 等. 新疆能源消费强度空间公平性分析及节能潜力评估[J]. 资源科学, 2013,35(11):2151-2157. |
[ Yin J J, Yang D G, Huo J W, et al. Energy consumption intensity space differences and the evaluation of the energy saving potential in Xinjiang[J]. Resources Science, 2013,35(11):2151-2157.] | |
[33] | Zheng D, Shi M J. Multiple environmental policies and pollution haven hypojournal: Evidence from China’s polluting industries[J]. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2017,141:295-304. |
[34] | 蔡乌赶, 李青青. 环境规制对企业生态技术创新的双重影响研究[J]. 科研管理, 2019,40(10):87-95. |
[ Cai W G, Li Q Q. Dual effect of environmental regulation on enterprise’s eco-technology innovation[J]. Science Research Management, 2019,40(10):87-95.] | |
[35] | 张国兴, 邓娜娜, 管欣, 等. 公众环境监督行为、公众环境参与政策对工业污染治理效率的影响: 基于中国省级面板数据的实证分析[J]. 中国人口·资源与环境, 2019,29(1):144-151. |
[ Zhang G X, Deng N N, Guan X, et al. The impact of public environmental supervision behavior and public environmental participation policy on the efficiency of industrial pollution governance: An empirical analysis based on China’s provincial panel data[J]. China Population, Resources and Environment, 2019,29(1):144-151.] | |
[36] | 童健, 武康平, 薛景. 我国环境财税体系的优化配置研究: 兼论经济增长和环境治理协调发展的实现途径[J]. 南开经济研究, 2017, (6):40-58. |
[ Tong J, Wu K P, Xue J. Research on optimizing environmental finance and taxation system in China[J]. Nankai Economic Studies, 2017, (6):40-58.] | |
[37] | 陈林, 肖倩冰, 蓝淑菁. 基于产业结构门槛效应模型的环境政策治污效益评估: 以《大气污染防治行动计划》为例[J]. 资源科学, 2021,43(2):341-356. |
[ Chen L, Xiao Q B, Lan S J. Pollution control effects of environmental policies based on threshold effect model of industrial structure: Taking the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Action Plan as an example[J]. Resources Science, 2021,43(2):341-356.] | |
[38] | Wang Y S, Wang J. Does industrial agglomeration facilitate environmental performance: New evidence from urban China?[J]. Journal of Environmental Management, 2019, DOI: 10.1016/j.jenvman.2019.07.015. |
[39] | Gamache D L, Mcnamara G. Responding to bad press: How CEO temporal focus influences the sensitivity to negative media coverage of acquisitions[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 2019,62(3):918-943. |
[40] | 于连超, 张卫国, 毕茜, 等. 环境政策不确定性与企业环境信息披露: 来自地方环保官员变更的证据[J]. 上海财经大学学报, 2020,22(2):35-50. |
[ Yu L C, Zhang W G, Bi Q, et al. Environmental policy uncertainty and corporate environmental information disclosure: Evidence from the turnover of local environmental protection directors[J]. Journal of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, 2020,22(2):35-50.] | |
[41] | 王慧, 孙慧, 肖涵月, 等. 环境政策不确定性、双向FDI与低碳全要素生产率的关系[J]. 中国人口·资源与环境, 2020,30(11):75-86. |
[ Wang H, Sun H, Xiao H Y, et al. Relationship between environmental policy uncertainty, two-way FDI and low-carbon TFP[J]. China Population, Resources and Environment, 2020,30(11):75-86.] | |
[42] | 王慧, 孙慧, 肖涵月, 等. “谨小慎微”抑或“险中求胜”? 环境政策不确定性与污染密集型企业绿色创新[J]. 产业经济研究, 2021, (2):30-41. |
[ Wang H, Sun H, Xiao H Y, et al. “Be cautious” or “Win in danger” ? Environmental policy uncertainty and green innovation of pollution-intensive enterprises[J]. Industrial Economics Research, 2021, (2):30-41.] |
[1] | 王凯, 郭鑫, 甘畅, 唐小惠, 刘浩龙. 中国省域科技创新与旅游业高质量发展水平及其互动关系[J]. 资源科学, 2022, 44(1): 114-126. |
[2] | 覃小华, 李星明, 时朋飞, 唐明贵. 中国西部地区旅游环境效率时空分异及影响因素[J]. 资源科学, 2022, 44(1): 143-155. |
[3] | 李虹, 王帅, 李晨光, 陈挺. 电价调整对宏观经济及产业结构的影响[J]. 资源科学, 2022, 44(1): 156-168. |
[4] | 张长征, 李嘉雯, 孙杰. 农田水利基础设施投资缺口对粮食生产效率损失的影响[J]. 资源科学, 2022, 44(1): 169-180. |
[5] | 祝孔超, 赵媛, 姚亚兵, 崔盼盼, 鄢继尧. 全球稀土进口竞争格局分析及潜在贸易联系预测[J]. 资源科学, 2022, 44(1): 70-84. |
[6] | 江文曲, 李晓云, 刘楚杰, 孙倩. 城乡居民膳食结构变化对中国水资源需求的影响——基于营养均衡的视角[J]. 资源科学, 2021, 43(8): 1662-1674. |
[7] | 张翠玲, 强文丽, 牛叔文, 王睿, 张赫, 成升魁, 李凡. 基于多目标的中国食物消费结构优化[J]. 资源科学, 2021, 43(6): 1140-1152. |
[8] | 李晨, 李昊玉, 孔海峥, 冯伟. 中国渔业生产系统隐含碳排放结构特征及驱动因素分解[J]. 资源科学, 2021, 43(6): 1166-1177. |
[9] | 刘丹, 李琳娜. 1995—2015年中国北方边境样带土地利用时空格局演变及驱动因素[J]. 资源科学, 2021, 43(6): 1208-1221. |
[10] | 罗海平, 邹楠, 胡学英, 王圣云. 1980—2019年中国粮食主产区主要粮食作物气候生产潜力与气候资源利用效率[J]. 资源科学, 2021, 43(6): 1234-1247. |
[11] | 刘宏笪, 张济建, 张茜. 全球供应链视角下的中国碳排放责任与形象[J]. 资源科学, 2021, 43(4): 652-668. |
[12] | 周迪, 罗东权. 绿色税收视角下产业结构变迁对中国碳排放的影响[J]. 资源科学, 2021, 43(4): 693-709. |
[13] | 韩梦瑶, 刘卫东, 谢漪甜, 姜宛贝. 中国省域碳排放的区域差异及脱钩趋势演变[J]. 资源科学, 2021, 43(4): 710-721. |
[14] | 姜宛贝, 刘卫东. 中国经济空间格局演变及其CO2排放效应[J]. 资源科学, 2021, 43(4): 722-732. |
[15] | 郭珊, 韩梦瑶, 杨玉浦. 中国省际隐含能源流动及能效冗余解析[J]. 资源科学, 2021, 43(4): 733-744. |
|