黄河流域生态补偿的水环境治理效应——基于双重差分方法的检验

doi:10.18402/resci.2021.11.11

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

黄河流域生态补偿是保障黄河长治久安,促进全流域高质量发展的重要制度设计。本文使用2007—2018年全国流域重点断面水质监测数据和中国城市统计年鉴数据,采用多期双重差分方法,对黄河流域生态补偿政策的水环境治理效应及其机制进行了实证检验。研究发现：①生态补偿政策的实施显著改善了黄河流域水环境治理效果,且黄河流域生态补偿呈现出显著的长期治污效应,该结论在进行一系列稳健性检验后依然成立。②机制分析表明,生态补偿政策的实施发挥了显著的制度激励效应,通过提高地方政府环境治理投资,降低工业废水排放,改善了黄河流域水污染状况。③从空间角度而言,与黄河流域中上游城市相比,生态补偿政策对下游城市水环境治理产生了更为显著的影响。据此,从健全流域横向生态补偿、重视中上游地区生态转移支付、建立多元主体联防联治水污染治理体系等角度提出改善黄河流域水环境治理的相关政策建议。

关键词: 生态补偿, 水环境治理, 环境治理投资, 污水减排, 双重差分方法, 黄河流域

Abstract:

Ecological compensation in the Yellow River Basin is an important system design to ensure the long-term stability of the Yellow River and promote the high-quality development of the entire river basin. This study used the national water quality monitoring data of key sections of the river basins from 2007 to 2018 and the data from the China City Statistical Yearbooks, and adopted the multi-period difference-in-difference method to empirically test the water environment governance effect and mechanism of the ecological compensation policy in the Yellow River Basin. The study found that the implementation of the ecological compensation policy has significantly improved the effect of water environment governance in the Yellow River Basin, and the ecological compensation in the Yellow River Basin has shown a significant long-term pollution control effect. This conclusion is still valid after a series of robustness tests. Mechanism analysis shows that the implementation of ecological compensation policy has had a significant institutional incentive effect. By increasing local government investment in environmental governance, reducing industrial wastewater discharge has improved the water pollution situation in the Yellow River Basin. From a spatial perspective, compared with cities in the upper and middle reaches of the Yellow River Basin, ecological compensation policy has had a more significant impact on the water environment management of downstream cities. Based on this, the article proposes relevant policy recommendations for improving the water environment of the Yellow River Basin from the perspectives of improving the horizontal ecological compensation within the river basin, attaching importance to the ecological transfer payment in the middle and upper reaches, and establishing a joint water pollution prevention and control system with multiple stakeholders.

Key words: ecological compensation, water environment governance, environmental governance investment, sewage emission reduction, difference- in- difference, Yellow River Basin

马军旗, 乐章. 黄河流域生态补偿的水环境治理效应——基于双重差分方法的检验[J]. 资源科学, 2021, 43(11): 2277-2288.

MA Junqi, YUE Zhang. Effects of ecological compensation on water environment governance in the Yellow River Basin: A test based on difference-in-difference method[J]. Resources Science, 2021, 43(11): 2277-2288.

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变量	变量定义与单位	样本数	均值	标准差	最小值	最大值
被解释变量
氨氮	城市监测点氨氮浓度/（mg/L）	9957	1.234	3.286	0.01	60.7
化学需氧量	城市监测点化学需氧量/（mg/L）	9957	5.896	10.366	0.1	241
解释变量
生态补偿政策	流域内城市是否推行了生态补偿政策,推行=1,未推行=0	9957	0.313	0.464	0	1
控制变量
上游水质	上游城市氨氮年均值/（mg/L）	9731	1.426	0.4768	0.603	2.145
经济发展水平	人均GDP/万元,取对数	9957	16.372	12.828	13.70	18.179
人口密度	城市总人口/城市区域面积/（人/km²）	9957	504.361	289.098	63.03	1052.58
工业化水平	规模以上工业总产值/万元,取对数	9957	16.700	0.959	13.551	18.500
产业结构	第二产业产值占GDP比重/%	9957	47.713	7.623	28.61	73.45
外商直接投资	外商直接投资额/万美元,取对数	9957	9.661	1.395	5.298	12.503
科技投入	科技支出占公共财政支出比重	9957	0.621	0.157	0.167	0.897
中介变量
环境治理投资	污水处理投资额/万元	9957	7671.53	12948.7	52	94430
污水排放量	工业废水排放量/万t,取对数	9957	8.376	0.864	4.875	9.946

	氨氮			化学需氧量
	（1）	（2）	（3）	（4）	（5）	（6）
生态补偿政策	-0.620***	-0.544***	-0.594***	-3.112***	-3.117***	-3.157***
	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.258)	(0.258)	(0.259)
上游水质	0.017***	1.001***	1.003***	1.729***	30.04***	30.08***
	(0.0045)	(0.0827)	(0.0807)	(0.279)	(0.931)	(0.932)
经济发展水平	-0.173**	-0.329***	-0.241***	-1.029***	-1.022***	-1.224***
	(0.087)	(0.0801)	(0.0799)	(0.270)	(0.271)	(0.277)
人口密度	0.000	-0.004***	-0.005***	0.0001	0.0002	0.0009
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
工业化水平	0.116*	-0.234***	-0.275***	-0.211	-0.213	-0.137
	(0.069)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.194)	(0.194)	(0.194)
产业结构	0.006	0.043***	0.0499***	0.271***	0.270***	0.275***
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)
外商直接投资	-0.229***	0.320***	0.302***	1.356***	1.351***	1.340***
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.104)
科技投入	-71.38***	2.129	5.642	-19.43	-19.07	-20.56
	(9.471)	(10.83)	(10.57)	(36.54)	(36.61)	(36.60)
控制变量	控制	控制	控制	控制	控制	控制
地区固定效应	不控制	控制	控制	不控制	控制	控制
时间固定效应	不控制	不控制	控制	不控制	不控制	控制
观测值	9957	9957	9957	9957	9957	9957
R²	0.043	0.563	0.587	0.525	0.498	0.502

	（1）	（2）	（3）	（4）	（5）	（6）
	投入效应	减排效应	氨氮	氨氮	化学需氧量	化学需氧量
生态补偿政策	0.251***	-0.059***	-0.578***	-0.604***	-3.093***	-3.133***
	(0.033)	(0.015)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.260)	(0.259)
投入效应			-0.092***		-0.255***
			(0.022)		（0.077）
减排效应				-0.053**		0.396**
				(0.048)		(0.168)
控制变量	控制	控制	控制	控制	控制	控制
地区固定效应	控制	控制	控制	控制	控制	控制
时间固定效应	控制	控制	控制	控制	控制	控制
观测值	9957	9957	9957	9957	9957	9957
R²	0.389	0.742	0.586	0.586	0.587	0.501

	（1）	（2）	（3）	（4）
	氨氮	化学需氧量	综合水质	溶解氧
生态补偿政策	-0.078*	-1.595***	-0.287***	0.774***
	(0.073)	(0.292)	(0.041)	(0.072)
控制变量	控制	控制	控制	控制
地区固定效应	控制	控制	控制	控制
时间固定效应	控制	控制	控制	控制
观测值	5141	5141	9957	9957
R²	0.746	0.712	0.350	0.501

	氨氮			化学需氧量
	上游	中游	下游	上游	中游	下游
	（1）	（2）	（3）	（1）	（2）	（3）
生态补偿政策	-0.015	-2.895	-0.631***	-0.360	-3.680	-13.680**
	(0.038)	(0.490)	(0.057)	(0.090)	(1.767)	(0.111)
控制变量	控制	控制	控制	控制	控制	控制
地区固定效应	控制	控制	控制	控制	控制	控制
时间固定效应	控制	控制	控制	控制	控制	控制
观测值	2717	1335	5905	2717	1335	5905
R²	0.604	0.692	0.390	0.270	0.671	0.494