双重水资源规制下异质涉煤生产企业的策略行为

doi:10.18402/resci.2021.11.09

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

在行政规制与水权交易共存的制度框架下,分析高耗水、异质涉煤生产企业的策略行为,是提高区域水资源规制效率的基础。采用复制动态方程描述存在内生差异的涉煤生产企业行为的相互作用过程,建立非对称演化博弈模型,理论分析表明：两类异质涉煤生产企业群体的行为演化存在3个局部渐近稳定点且存在如下特征：惩罚程度由弱至强,涉煤生产企业群体的行为选择由“不友好”过渡为“友好”;当惩罚程度介于两类涉煤生产企业的额外收益时,其策略行为出现分化。结合不同惩罚程度情景的计算实验和仿真分析可知：“最小”期望效用差的变化驱动两类企业群体行为分化;弱势涉煤生产企业是“不友好”行为的跟随者和“友好”行为的领先者;群体“不友好”的初始状态不直接作用于企业行为选择,但是当两类企业群体的初始“不友好”概率均大于0.5时,水权交易将影响强势涉煤生产企业的行为收敛速率。研究结果表明行政惩罚能有效引导涉煤生产企业的“水友好”行为。因此,为了确保合理的市场集中度,应针对规制对象内生差异设计不同规制惩罚程度;并根据涉煤生产企业群体的初始“不友好”状况,引入水权交易可以有效增强惩罚规制的实施效果。

关键词: 水资源规制, 涉煤生产企业, 非对称演化博弈, 复制动态方程, 计算实验, 仿真

Abstract:

Under the institutional framework of administrative regulation and water rights transaction, analyzing the different strategic behaviors of high-water consuming, coal-based enterprises is the basis for improving the efficiency of water resource governance. This article describes the interaction of the behaviors of endogenous coal-based enterprises by using the replication dynamic equation, which establishes an asymmetric evolutionary game model, and examines the change of behavior of enterprises. The theoretical analysis presents that there are three local asymptotically stable points in the behavioral change, which shows the following characteristics: when the punishment degree shifts from weak to strong, the behaviors of coal-based enterprises evolve from non-cooperation to cooperation; when punishment is between the extra income of coal-based enterprises from two different groups, different strategic behaviors occur. The calculation experiments and scenario simulation were designed based on different scenarios classified by the degree of punishment, which reveal that the change of expected utilities’ difference drives the differentiation of behavior; the degree of punishment drives the heterogeneous coal-based producers’ behavior to converge to different evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). If the initial probabilities of non-cooperation are beyond (0.50, 0.50), water rights transaction affects behavioral convergence rate and lacks effect on the trend of change. The results have some implications for water resources regulation in coal-rich areas: given the heterogeneities among coal-based producers, optimizing the punishment regulation is required, which contributes to a reasonable market concentration; within certain punishment range, regulation efficiency can be improved by adjusting the initial probability of non-cooperation and the cost caused by water rights transaction.

Key words: water resource regulation, coal-based enterprises, asymmetric evolutionary game, replication dynamic equation, computational experiment, simulation

陈亚林, 刘姣姣, 王先甲, 于荣. 双重水资源规制下异质涉煤生产企业的策略行为[J]. 资源科学, 2021, 43(11): 2251-2263.

CHEN Yalin, LIU Jiaojiao, WANG Xianjia, YU Rong. Strategic behavior of heterogeneous coal-based enterprises under dual regulations[J]. Resources Science, 2021, 43(11): 2251-2263.

图/表 12

表1

模型变量与参数

符号	定义	符号	定义
$U a$	双方均选择友好行为时,强势企业获得收益	$U d$	双方均选择友好行为时,弱势厂商获得收益
$c a$	强势企业扩大产量的额外生产成本	$c d$	弱势企业扩大产量的额外生产成本
$Δ u a$	强势企业扩大产量所获额外收益 $(Δ u a > c a)$	Δ $u d$	弱势企业扩大产量所获额外收益( $Δ u d > c d$ )
$c aw$	强势企业通过水权交易支付的额外水成本	$c dw$	弱势企业通过水权交易支付的额外水成本
Δ $l a$	强势企业单方采取“友好”行为,所损失的市场收益	Δ $l d$	弱势企业单方采取“友好”行为,所损失的市场收益
$α$	政府部门监管成功率( $0 < α < 1$ )	$R$	涉煤生产企业超额取水的行政惩罚

表1

表2

异质涉煤生产企业支付矩阵

		强势企业
		友好	不友好
弱势企业	友好	$U a; U d$	$U a - Δ l a; U d + Δ u d - c d αR$
弱势企业	不友好	$U a + Δ u a - c a - αR; U d - Δ l d$	$U a + Δ u a - c a - c aw - αR; U d + Δ u d - c d - c dw αR$

表2

图1

图2

表3

异质涉煤生产企业计算实验参数值设定

强势企业		弱势企业
$Δ u a$	100	$Δ u d$	50
$c a$	25	$c d$	40
$c aw$	12	$c dw$	15
$Δ l a$	6	$Δ l d$	9
$α$	0.5	$α$	0.5

表3

图3

图4

图5

图6

图7

图8

图9

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