资源科学 ›› 2021, Vol. 43 ›› Issue (7): 1361-1374.doi: 10.18402/resci.2021.07.07

• 宅基地产权与退出机制 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于联盟利益分配的宅基地退出增值收益共享研究——以浙江省典型县市为例

苑韶峰(), 干欣怡, 唐奕钰   

  1. 浙江工商大学公共管理学院,杭州310018
  • 收稿日期:2021-04-12 修回日期:2021-07-21 出版日期:2021-07-25 发布日期:2021-08-27
  • 作者简介:苑韶峰,男,山西繁峙人,教授,博士生导师,西湖学者,研究方向为土地经济与政策。E-mail: shaofengyuan1975@163.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(41871181);教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目(18YJA630136);教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目(19YJA630099)

Increment income sharing of rural homestead withdrawal based on alliance interest distribution: A case of typical counties and cities in Zhejiang Province

YUAN Shaofeng(), GAN Xinyi, TANG Yiyu   

  1. School of Public Administration, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou 310018, China
  • Received:2021-04-12 Revised:2021-07-21 Online:2021-07-25 Published:2021-08-27

摘要:

建立科学合理的宅基地退出增值收益分配机制是有效调动各方积极性以促进宅基地退出的有效途径。本文在联盟利益分配机制下构建基于贡献的宅基地退出增值收益分配模型,对浙江省典型县市进行测算,探讨了宅基地退出中各主体的贡献和增值收益分配比例的区位差异。结果表明:①以宅基地退出中农户与集体的机会成本和政府的投资成本为依据,测算得到的宅基地退出增值收益分配比例接近于改革试点地区的地方政策标准和典型实践案例;②宅基地退出增值收益中各主体的贡献具有显著的区域差异性和城乡梯度性。农户和集体的贡献均呈现慈溪>义乌>嘉兴>泰顺>云和的分异特征和城中村>近郊型>远郊型>边远型的递减规律,政府的贡献呈现嘉兴>慈溪>义乌>泰顺>云和的分异特征。③不同地域和村域区位对应不同的宅基地退出增值收益分配格局。不同地域下,嘉兴、慈溪、义乌的农户增值收益分配比例较高,泰顺、云和的政府和集体分配比例较高;不同村域下,城中村、近郊型村庄的农户和集体增值收益分配比例较高,远郊型、边远型村庄的政府和农户分配比例较高。基于此,应根据区位差异,关注各方利益损失,遵循“按贡献分配”原则构建兼顾公平与效率的宅基地退出增值收益分配机制。

关键词: 宅基地退出, 增值收益分配, 联盟利益分配机制, 土地发展权, 样带, 浙江省

Abstract:

Developing a scientific and fair income distribution mechanism is an effective way to mobilize all parties in order to promote homestead withdrawal This study constructed a contribution-based increment income distribution model of homestead withdrawal under the alliance interest distribution mechanism. It also measured the typical counties and cities in Zhejiang Province and discussed the spatial differences of the contribution and distribution proportion of increment income of each party in homestead withdrawal. Important results are as follows: (1) Based on the opportunity cost of farmers and collective economic organizations and the capitalized cost of governments, the theoretical distribution proportions of increment income in homestead withdrawal are close to local policy standards and typical cases in practice. (2) The contribution of each party in the increment income of homestead withdrawal has significant regional differences and exhibits an urban-rural gradient. The contributions of farmers and collective economic organizations show the pattern of Cixi > Yiwu > Jiaxing > Taishun > Yunhe and a trend of village in the city > suburban village > exsuburb village > remote villages. The contributions of increment income of the governments show the pattern of Jiaxing > Cixi > Yiwu > Taishun > Yunhe. (3) Different regions and village locations correspond to different homestead withdrawal increment income distribution patterns. At the regional level, the distribution proportions of of increment income farmers are relatively high in Jiaxing, Cixi, and Yiwu, and the distribution proportions of governments and collective economic organizations are relatively high in Taishun and Yunhe. At the village level, the distribution proportions of increment income of farmers and collective economic organizations are relatively high in villages in the city and suburban villages, and the distribution proportions of governments and farmers are relatively high in exsuburb villages and remote villages. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a distribution mechanism of homestead withdrawal increment income following the principle of allocation fairness and efficiency, according to the location differences and the interest loss of all parties.

Key words: homestead withdrawal, increment income distribution, alliance benefit distribution mechanism, land development right, sample belt, Zhejiang Province