资源科学 ›› 2021, Vol. 43 ›› Issue (6): 1128-1139.doi: 10.18402/resci.2021.06.06

• 资源管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

环境分权对中国污染减排效果的影响——基于空间动态面板模型的检验

徐辉1,2(), 王成亮1, 冯国强1,2()   

  1. 1.兰州大学经济学院,兰州 730000
    2.兰州大学县域经济研究院,兰州 730000
  • 收稿日期:2020-10-23 修回日期:2021-06-01 出版日期:2021-06-25 发布日期:2021-08-25
  • 通讯作者: 冯国强,男,贵州遵义人,副教授,硕士生导师,主要研究方向为制度经济学、人口资源与环境经济学。E-mail: fenggq@lzu.edu.cn
  • 作者简介:徐辉,女,甘肃兰州人,教授,博士生导师,主要研究方向为生态经济与资源环境管理。E-mail: xhhui@lzu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(41971127);国家自然科学基金项目(71903079)

Impact of environmental decentralization on pollution reduction effects in China: A test based on spatial dynamic panel model

XU Hui1,2(), WANG Chengliang1, FENG Guoqiang1,2()   

  1. 1. School of Economics, Lanzhou University, Lanzhou 730000, China
    2. Institute of County Economic Development, Lanzhou University, Lanzhou 730000, China
  • Received:2020-10-23 Revised:2021-06-01 Online:2021-06-25 Published:2021-08-25

摘要:

环境分权能否助推由经济与财政分权引起的负向激励,进而影响减排治污效果,以往研究中始终没有达成共识。本文利用2001—2016年中国省级面板数据,通过测算省级环境监管权限的配置格局,结合空间动态面板模型,对分别以PM2.5浓度、人均废水排放量、人均一般工业固体废物产生量表征的大气污染、水污染、固废污染指标进行回归,以此检验环境分权的减排效果及其作用机制。结果表明:①环境分权弱化了减排效果,分权程度越高,3种污染指标的污染程度越重,其中对大气污染的作用最大,对水污染的作用最小;②大气污染与环境分权之间呈倒U型的非线性关系,水污染、固废污染与环境分权之间非线性关系不显著;③环境监测、执法与监察3项监管权限的分权程度对污染物减排效果的影响显著为负,其中环境执法的地方分权程度负效应最大,环境监察的负效应最小;④尽管环境分权弱化了减排效果,但将经济事务上的分权激励考虑进模型当中时,环境分权反而对分权激励与合谋污染有抑制作用。本文的政策启示是:要进一步提升环保政策的执行效果,提高地方政府减排的执行能力,对环保机构进行实质性的垂直管理改革势在必然;结合地区在经济发展上的分权激励,适当给予地方环保政策执行的灵活度,一定程度上也能提升减排效果。

关键词: 环境分权, 污染减排, 监管权限, 空间计量, 财政分权, 垂直管理改革

Abstract:

There is no consensus in the literature on the role of environmental decentralization in pollution reduction and control, and whether it can become an important driver of decentralized incentives in pollution control. Based on the data from 2001 to 2016 at the provincial level of China, this study examined the environmental regulatory authority and the allocation pattern of the three regulatory powers at the provincial level, and regressed PM2.5, wastewater discharge per capita, general industrial solid waste output per capita, which represent air pollution, water pollution and solid waste pollution respectively, with the spatial dynamic panel model to test the role and mechanism of environmental decentralization. The results show that: (1) Environmental decentralization weakened the effect of pollution reduction. The higher the degree of decentralization is, the higher the degree of pollution of PM2.5, water pollution, and solid waste pollution. Of these, decentralization had the greatest effect on PM2.5 and the least effect on water pollution; (2) The relationship between air pollution and environmental decentralization showed a nonlinear inverted-U trend, and water pollutant and solid waste pollution and environmental decentralization did not show a significant nonlinear relationship; (3) The decentralization of environmental law enforcement power, monitoring power, and supervision power had a significantly negative impact on pollution reduction, among which the environmental law enforcement power played the largest role, and the supervision power played the smallest role; (4) Environmental decentralization weakened the effect of pollution reduction, but when the decentralization incentives of economic affairs were taken into account in the model, environmental decentralization showed a negative effect on decentralization incentives and collusion in pollution control. The policy implications of these results are: to further improve the implementation effect of environmental protection policies and the implementation ability of local governments in pollution reduction and control, it is inevitable to carry out substantive vertical system reform for environmental protection institutions. Combined with the decentralization incentive of regional economic development, it is appropriate to provide flexibility to the implementation of local environmental protection policies, which can also improve the pollution reduction and control effect to a certain extent.

Key words: environmental decentralization, pollution reduction, regulatory authority, spatial measurement, fiscal decentralization, reform for vertical management