沿海城市经济增长目标约束对近海污染的影响

doi:10.18402/resci.2021.05.04

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

理解沿海地方政府经济发展行为对于近海环境治理具有重要意义。本文采用2004—2017年中国48个沿海城市近海污染物浓度以及经济增长目标约束数据,考察沿海城市经济增长目标约束对近海污染的影响,并在此基础上利用财政压力和晋升激励数据,检验了经济增长目标约束对近海污染的异质性影响。结果表明：相比未采用任何约束,施加经济增长目标硬约束会导致无机氮浓度提高约0.020 mg/L,占无机氮浓度均值的比重约为7.17%。由沿海省级到市级经济增长目标的逐级加码幅度每提高1%,近海无机氮浓度将提高约0.007 mg/L,占无机氮浓度均值的比重约为2.51%。上述结果表明,沿海城市经济增长目标硬约束和逐级加码均会加剧近海污染。经济增长目标约束对近海污染的影响会因财政压力以及官员晋升激励的差异而有所不同,在面临高财政压力以及主政官员具有高晋升激励的沿海城市,经济增长目标硬约束以及逐级加码对近海环境的不利影响更为显著。

关键词: 经济增长目标约束, 逐级加码, 近海污染, 财政压力, 晋升激励

Abstract:

Understanding the economic development behavior of coastal local governments is of great significance for coastal environmental governance. This study used the data on the concentration of offshore pollutants and economic growth target constraints in 48 coastal cities of China from 2004 to 2017 to test the impact of economic growth target on offshore pollution. The heterogeneous impact of economic growth target on offshore pollution was also tested based on financial pressure and promotion incentive data. The results show that compared with no constraints, imposing hard constraints of economic growth targets increases the concentration of inorganic nitrogen by about 0.020 mg/L, accounting for 7.17% of the average concentration of inorganic nitrogen. For every increase of 1% of the top-down amplification in the economic growth target from the coastal provincial level to the municipal level, the offshore inorganic nitrogen concentration increased by about 0.007 mg/L, accounting for 2.51% of the average inorganic nitrogen concentration. The above results show that hard constraints and top-down amplification in the economic growth targets of coastal cities aggravated offshore pollution. The impact of economic growth target on coastal pollution varied due to financial pressures and differences in promotion incentives for officials. In coastal cities facing high financial pressures and where officials have high promotion incentives, hard constraints of economic growth targets and top-down amplification had more significant adverse effects on the offshore environment.

Key words: economic growth target constraints, top-down amplification, offshore pollution, financial pressure, promotion incentives

沈伟腾, 胡求光, 余璇. 沿海城市经济增长目标约束对近海污染的影响[J]. 资源科学, 2021, 43(5): 898-908.

SHEN Weiteng, HU Qiuguang, YU Xuan. Impact of coastal city economic growth target on offshore pollution[J]. Resources Science, 2021, 43(5): 898-908.

图/表 5

图1

表1

表2

表3

表4

参考文献 21

[1]	周黎安. 中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J]. 经济研究, 2007, 42(7): 36-50.
	[Zhou L A. Governing China’s local officials: An analysis of promotion tournament model[J]. Economic Research Journal, 2007, 42(7): 36-50.]
[2]	刘华军, 彭莹. 雾霾污染区域协同治理的“逐底竞争”检验[J]. 资源科学, 2019, 41(1): 185-195.
	[Liu H J, Peng Y. “Race to the bottom” test of collaborative management in haze pollution area[J]. Resources Science, 2019, 41(7): 185-195.]
[3]	国家海洋督察组. 国家海洋督察组反馈5省市督察情况[N/OL]. (2018-07-04) [2020-08-18]. https://www.sohu.com/a/240426178_726570.
	[National Marine Inspection Team. The National Marine Inspection Team Gave Feedback on Inspections in 5 Provinces and Cities[N/OL]. (2018-07-04) [2020-08-18]. https://www.sohu.com/a/240426178_726570.]
[4]	Wang Z B, Bu C, Li H M, et al. Seawater environmental Kuznets curve: Evidence from seawater quality in China’s coastal waters[J]. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2019, 219:925-935. doi: 10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.02.012
[5]	付秀梅, 王娜, 项尧尧, 等. 海洋经济增长与环境污染水平关系的实证分析[J]. 中国渔业经济, 2016, 34(5): 85-90.
	[Fu X M, Wang N, Xiang Y Y, et al. Analysis of relationship between marine economic growth and environmental pollution[J]. Chinese Fisheries Economics, 2016, 34(5): 85-90.]
[6]	段欣荣, 张淑敏, 崔伯豪, 等. 中国沿海地区省域经济发展与海洋环境污染关系的EKC模型检验[J]. 海洋经济, 2020, 10(1): 13-21.
	[Duan X R, Zhang S M, Cui B H, et al. EKC framework analysis of relationship between provincial economic development and marine environmental pollution in coastal areas of China[J]. Marine Economy, 2020, 10(1): 13-21.]
[7]	张继平, 潘易晨, 孔凡宏, 等. 政治晋升激励视角下我国海洋陆源污染治理的研究[J]. 中国海洋大学学报(社会科学版), 2017, (4): 20-26.
	[Zhang J P, Pan Y C, Kong F H, et al. A study of China’s land-based marine pollution governance from the perspective of political promotion[J]. Journal of Ocean University of China (Social Sciences), 2017, (4): 20-26.]
[8]	Jiang S S, Li J M. Do political promotion incentive and fiscal incentive of local governments matter for the marine environmental pollution? Evidence from China’s coastal areas[J]. Marine Policy, 2021, DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2021.104505. doi: 10.1016/j.marpol.2021.104505
[9]	Beeson M. The coming of environmental authoritarianism[J]. Environmental politics, 2010, 19(2): 276-294. doi: 10.1080/09644010903576918
[10]	Jia R X. Pollution for Promotion[R]. 21st Century China Center Research Paper No.2017-05, 2017.
[11]	余泳泽, 潘妍. 中国经济高速增长与服务业结构升级滞后并存之谜: 基于地方经济增长目标约束视角的解释[J]. 经济研究, 2019, 54(3): 150-165.
	[Yu Y Z, Pan Y. The mysterious coexistence of rapid economic growth and a lag in the service industry’s upgrade in China: An interpretation based on the economic growth target constraints perspective[J]. Economic Research Journal, 2019, 54(3): 150-165.]
[12]	余泳泽, 刘大勇, 龚宇. 过犹不及事缓则圆:地方经济增长目标约束与全要素生产率[J]. 管理世界, 2019, 35(7): 26-42.
	[Yu Y Z, Liu D Y, Gong Y. Target of local economic growth and total factor productivity[J]. Management World, 2019, 35(7): 26-42.]
[13]	Li X, Liu C, Weng X, et al. Target setting in tournaments: Theory and evidence from China[J]. The Economic Journal, 2019, 129(623): 2888-2915. doi: 10.1093/ej/uez018
[14]	孙开, 张磊. 分权程度省际差异、财政压力与基本公共服务支出偏向: 以地方政府间权责安排为视角[J]. 财贸经济, 2019, 40(8): 18-32.
	[Sun K, Zhang L. Inter-provincial differences in decentralization, fiscal pressure and the bias of basic public service expenditure: From the perspective of local governments’power and responsibility arrangement[J]. Finance & Trade Economics, 2019, 40(8): 18-32.]
[15]	Bai J H, Lu J Y, Li S J. Fiscal pressure, tax competition and environmental pollution[J]. Environmental and Resource Economics, 2019, 73:431-447. doi: 10.1007/s10640-018-0269-1
[16]	张帆, 邓宏兵, 彭永樟. 长江经济带经济集聚对工业废水排放影响的空间溢出效应与门槛特征[J]. 资源科学, 2021, 43(1): 57-68.
	[Zhang F, Deng H B, Peng Y Z. Spatial spillover effect and threshold characteristics of economic agglomeration onindustrial wastewater discharge in the Yangtze River Economic Belt[J]. Resources Science, 2021, 43(1): 57-68.]
[17]	Petersen M A. Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing approaches[J]. The Review of Financial Studies, 2008, 22(1): 435-480. doi: 10.1093/rfs/hhn053
[18]	Driscoll J C, Kraay A C. Consistent covariance matrix estimation with spatially dependent panel data[J]. Review of Economics and Statistics, 1998, 80(4): 549-560. doi: 10.1162/003465398557825
[19]	李静, 池金, 吴华清. 基于水资源的工业绿色偏向型技术进步测度与分析[J]. 中国人口·资源与环境, 2018, 28(10): 131-142.
	[Li J, Chi J, Wu H Q. Measurement and analysis of industrial green biased technological progress based on water resources[J]. China Population, Resources and Environment, 2018, 28(10): 131-142.]
[20]	Yu J H, Zhou L A, Zhu G Z. Strategic interaction in political competition: Evidence from spatial effects across Chinese cities[J]. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 2016, 57:23-37. doi: 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2015.12.003
[21]	吴敏, 周黎安. 晋升激励与城市建设: 公共品可视性的视角[J]. 经济研究, 2018, 53(12): 97-111.
	[Wu M, Zhou L A. Political incentives and city construction: The visibility of public projects[J]. Economic Research Journal, 2018, 53(12): 97-111.]

变量名称	变量含义	观测值	均值	标准差	最小值	最大值
InorganicN	无机氮浓度/（mg/L）	669	0.279	0.299	0.003	2.271
Tough	经济增长目标硬约束	649	0.139	0.346	0.000	1.000
RTough	经济增长目标软约束	649	0.225	0.418	0.000	1.000
Tough3	经济增长目标约束强度（高强度=3,中强度=2,低强度=1）	649	1.914	0.597	1.000	3.000
Upon	由省级层面到地级市层面的经济增长目标加码/%	649	2.354	2.201	-3.000	16.000
Basinpoll	流域劣五类水质占比/%	672	12.600	13.500	0.000	57.000
lnPergdp	实际人均GDP对数值	672	10.373	0.655	8.500	12.784
lnPergdp²	实际人均GDP自然对数值的平方	672	108.023	13.544	72.250	163.418
lnDensity	人口密度自然对数值	671	7.646	0.719	5.557	9.908
lnPatgranted	专利授权量自然对数值	672	7.156	1.852	1.609	11.449
Urbanization	城镇化率/%	672	47.943	20.618	10.142	100.000
Secondgdp	第二产业占GDP比重/%	671	48.156	10.608	12.100	82.280
lnMgdp	实际海洋生产总值对数值	672	7.924	1.255	2.226	9.809

变量	被解释变量：无机氮浓度
变量	(1)	(2)	(3)
Tough	0.020**		0.019**
	(0.008)		(0.008)
RTough	-0.001		-0.002
	(0.009)		(0.009)
Upon		0.007***	0.007***
		(0.002)	(0.002)
lnPergdp	-0.720***	-0.780***	-0.777***
	(0.192)	(0.199)	(0.193)
lnPergdp²	0.031***	0.034***	0.034***
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)
lnDensity	0.038***	0.038**	0.037***
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)
lnPatgranted	0.048	0.051	0.052*
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Urbanization	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Secondgdp	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
lnMgdp	0.008	0.006	0.005
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
截距项	3.498***	3.805***	3.801***
	(0.880)	(0.926)	(0.904)
城市固定效应	是	是	是
年份固定效应	是	是	是
N	646	646	646
组内R²	0.357	0.361	0.362
Pesaran统计值	3.986***	4.002***	3.883***

变量	被解释变量：无机氮浓度
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	高压力	低压力	高压力	低压力	高激励	低激励	高激励	低激励
Tough	0.017*	0.001			0.027**	0.014
	(0.008)	(0.008)			(0.012)	(0.016)
RTough	-0.010	-0.016			0.001	-0.013
	(0.017)	(0.009)			(0.014)	(0.026)
Upon			0.010**	-0.004			0.010**	0.002
			(0.004)	(0.004)			(0.004)	(0.002)
控制变量	是	是	是	是	是	是	是	是
城市固定效应	是	是	是	是	是	是	是	是
年份固定效应	是	是	是	是	是	是	是	是
N	356	290	356	290	412	234	412	234
组内R²	0.455	0.131	0.460	0.129	0.362	0.444	0.370	0.442

变量	被解释变量：无机氮浓度
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	南方	北方	南方	北方	高治理能力	低治理能力	高治理能力	低治理能力
Tough	0.015**	0.026			0.037**	-0.007
	(0.006)	(0.021)			(0.013)	(0.015)
RTough	-0.008	-0.005			-0.005	-0.010
	(0.008)	(0.011)			(0.021)	(0.007)
Upon			0.003	0.007***			0.009***	0.007*
			(0.003)	(0.002)			(0.003)	(0.004)
控制变量	是	是	是	是	是	是	是	是
城市固定效应	是	是	是	是	是	是	是	是
年份固定效应	是	是	是	是	是	是	是	是
N	398	248	398	248	367	278	367	278
组内R²	0.430	0.352	0.430	0.357	0.450	0.240	0.450	0.250