资源科学 ›› 2020, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (12): 2393-2405.doi: 10.18402/resci.2020.12.11

• 资源管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

可再生能源配额考核监管与主体行为策略选择

黄涛珍1(), 商波2()   

  1. 1.河海大学公共管理学院,南京 211100
    2.河海大学商学院,南京 211100
  • 收稿日期:2019-11-18 修回日期:2020-03-10 出版日期:2020-12-25 发布日期:2021-02-25
  • 通讯作者: 商波
  • 作者简介:黄涛珍,女,江西丰城人,教授,博士生导师,研究方向为资源环境管理、技术经济理论与方法研究。E-mail: tzhhuang@hhu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金重点支持项目(91747208);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(B200203169);江苏省研究生科研与实践创新计划项目(KYCX20_0511)

Assessment and supervision of renewable portfolio standards and strategic selection of stakeholders

HUANG Taozhen1(), SHANG Bo2()   

  1. 1. School of Public Administration, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China
    2. School of Business, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China
  • Received:2019-11-18 Revised:2020-03-10 Online:2020-12-25 Published:2021-02-25
  • Contact: SHANG Bo

摘要:

为支持可再生能源行业的健康发展和实现低碳环保效益,在权衡社会多方的复杂利益后,中国正式推行了可再生能源电力配额政策,而加强政策执行和考核监管力度是实行配额制的重要保障。本文运用演化博弈理论分析了中央政府、地方政府与电网企业关于可再生能源配额指标完成情况的考核监管问题,讨论了不同情景下主体行为的策略选择。结果表明:①在考虑惩罚约束的情景下,增加惩罚力度能够促使电网企业完成可再生能源总量和非水电配额的双项指标任务。但如果地方政府缺少激励,也会放松监管力度。②在实现超额配额的激励情景下,激励性指标设定在10%~30%之间,中央政府对地方政府采取严格监管策略的激励作用较弱。但在33%~47%之间时,可起到显著的激励作用。③在两种过渡情景的数值模拟中,单纯地增加激励比例不是中央政府的最好选择,需要同时增加最低配额的约束比重,才能实现对地方政府的最优激励。上述研究可为中国建立和完善具有激励性的可再生能源配额考核监管制度提供理论指导和实践参考。

关键词: 可再生能源电力配额, 考核监管, 激励性指标, 约束性指标, 演化博弈, 策略选择

Abstract:

In order to support the healthy development of renewable energy and realize low-carbon environmental benefits, China has implemented the renewable portfolio standards policy after the coordination of multiple social interests, and strengthening the policy implementation and assessment and supervision are the guarantee for the implementation of the renewable portfolio standards. The method of evolutionary game was used to analyze the problem of quota target completion and inspection regulation among the central government, local governments, and power grid companies, and the principle of system dynamics was also used to reflect the inner game structure and its dynamic evolution mechanism of the tripartite stakeholders, whose strategic choices are discussed under different scenarios. The results show that: (1) In the scenario of punishment constraint, increasing punishment can help power grid enterprises to fulfill the dual targets of total renewable energy and non-hydropower renewable portfolio standards. But if the government lacks incentives, it will also loosen regulation. (2) Under the incentive scenario of realizing excess quota, the incentive radio is set by central government between 10% and 30%, which has a weak incentive effect on local governments to adopt a strict regulation strategy, but can have a significant incentive effect at between 33% and 47%. (3) Under the transitional scenarios, it is not the best choice for the central government to simply increase the incentive ratio. It is necessary to increase the constraint proportion of the minimum quota at the same time to realize the optimal incentive for local governments. This research may provide theoretical guidance and has practical values for the establishment and improvement of incentive assessment and supervision system of renewable portfolio standards in China.

Key words: renewable portfolio standards, assessment and supervision, incentive index, binding index, evolutionary game, strategic selection