政府主导型生态补偿的多中心治理——基于农户社会网络的视角

doi:10.18402/resci.2020.05.02

资源科学 ›› 2020, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (5): 812-824.doi: 10.18402/resci.2020.05.02

政府主导型生态补偿的多中心治理——基于农户社会网络的视角

陈海江¹, 司伟²(), 刘泽琦², 李朝柱³, 张燕燕⁴

1.绍兴文理学院商学院,绍兴 312000;
2.中国农业大学经济与管理学院,北京 100083;
3.浙江农林大学暨阳学院,绍兴 311800;
4.上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院,上海 200433

收稿日期:2019-08-20 修回日期:2020-03-29 出版日期:2020-05-25 发布日期:2020-07-25
通讯作者: 司伟
作者简介:陈海江,男,浙江绍兴人,博士,研究方向为农业经济理论与政策。E-mail：chenhaijiangcau@163.com
基金资助:
农业农村部软科学项目(RRX2019019A);国家大豆产业技术体系专项(CRAS-04-07B);浙江省社科规划项目(20NDQN324YB)

Polycentric governance of government-led ecological compensation: Based on the perspective of farmers’ social network

Haijiang CHEN¹, Wei SI²(), Zeqi LIU², Chaozhu LI³, Yanyan ZHANG⁴

1. Business College, Shaoxing University, Shaoxing 312000, China;
2. College of Economics and Management, China Agricultural University, Beijing 100083, China;
3. Jiyang College of Zhejiang Agriculture and Forestry University, Shaoxing 311800, China;
4. College of Public Economics and Management, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433, China

Received:2019-08-20 Revised:2020-03-29 Online:2020-05-25 Published:2020-07-25
Contact: Wei SI

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

政府主导型生态补偿由于补偿资金来源单一,因此项目提供的生态服务通常和政策周期同步,持续性较差。本文以改善该类生态补偿项目生态服务的持续性为目标,以粮豆轮作补贴这一政府主导型生态补偿为例,基于多中心治理理论和二元Probit模型、双变量Probit模型研究了社会网络对农户粮豆轮作决策的影响,探索实现政府主导型生态补偿项目多中心治理的路径。研究结果显示：①亲缘社会网络显著促进农户进行粮豆轮作,而友缘社会网络对农户粮豆轮作决策的影响不显著;②亲缘社会网络有助于农户将粮豆轮作意愿转化为具体行为。结合以上两点推断：亲缘社会网络可以成为政府补偿之外的激励机制,促进农户进行粮豆轮作。本文的研究结论支持政府主导型生态补偿项目采取政府补偿+自主治理（社会网络）这一多中心治理模式。这对于提高长江流域和黄淮海地区正在实施的轮作补贴项目生态服务的持续性具有一定的政策启示,同时对此后出台的政府主导型生态补偿政策亦具有一定的借鉴意义。

关键词: 社会网络, 多中心治理, 生态补偿, 政府主导, 粮豆轮作, 可持续性

Abstract:

Government-led ecological compensation has a single source of funding, therefore, the ecological services provided by the projects are usually synchronized with the policy cycle, and has poor sustainability. This paper aims to improve the sustainability of ecological services in such ecological compensation projects, and takes grain-bean rotation subsidy, a government-led ecological compensation, as an example.Based on the polycentric governance theory, Dual Probit model and Bivariate Probit model, this paper studied the influence of social network on farmers' crop rotation decision, and explored the path to realize polycentric governance of government-led ecological compensation project. The results show that: (1) Kin social network significantly promoted the adoption of grain-bean rotation technology by the farmers, while friend social network had no significant influence on the adoption of grain-bean rotation technology by the farmers. (2) The kin social network can help farmers to transform their willingness to practice grain-bean rotation into specific behaviors. Based on the above two points, it can be concluded that kin social network can be another mechanism besides government compensation to promote grain-bean rotation among farmers. The research result supports that government-led ecological compensation projects can adopt the polycentric governance model of government compensation + autonomous governance (social network). This has certain policy implications for improving the sustainability of the ecological services of the current grain-bean rotation subsidy projects in the Yangtze River Basin and the Huang-Huai-Hai Region, as well as certain reference significance for other government-led ecological compensation projects in the future.

Key words: social network, polycentric governance, ecological compensation, government-led, grain-bean rotation, sustainability

陈海江, 司伟, 刘泽琦, 李朝柱, 张燕燕. 政府主导型生态补偿的多中心治理——基于农户社会网络的视角[J]. 资源科学, 2020, 42(5): 812-824.

Haijiang CHEN, Wei SI, Zeqi LIU, Chaozhu LI, Yanyan ZHANG. Polycentric governance of government-led ecological compensation: Based on the perspective of farmers’ social network[J]. Resources Science, 2020, 42(5): 812-824.

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样本市	东部		南部		西南部		西部			北部			中部
样本市	佳木斯市		哈尔滨市		大庆市		齐齐哈尔市			黑河市			绥化市
样本县	富锦市	同江市	依兰县	尚志市	肇州县	林甸县	依安县	讷河市	克山县	北安市	五大连池市	嫩江县	海伦市	庆安县	明水县
样本量/个	90	89	90	70	58	90	84	80	89	88	88	90	89	86	89

变量名称	变量含义及赋值	均值	标准差
因变量
农户是否进行粮豆轮作	是=1,否=0	0.461	0.499
解释变量
亲缘社会网络	2018年春节亲戚来访数;单位：户	5.831	7.295
友缘社会网络	2018年春节老乡、朋友来访数;单位：户	5.480	9.744
户主性别	男=1,女=0	0.956	0.206
户主年龄	单位：岁	49.732	9.424
户主受教育程度	单位：年	7.580	3.001
户主是否为村干部	是=1,否=0	0.158	0.365
户主是否兼业	是=1,否=0	0.266	0.442
户主是否接受过技术培训	是=1,否=0	0.167	0.373
户主是否具有粮豆轮作意愿	是=1,否=0	0.772	0.420
家庭经营规模	单位：亩	198.845	521.679
家庭农业收入占比	农业收入占家庭总收入的比例;90%以上=1, 50%~90%之间=2（含50%和90%）,50%以下=3	1.357	0.619
家庭人口数	单位：个	3.488	1.378
是否参加专业合作组织	是=1,否=0	0.213	0.409
2017年是否享有粮豆轮作补贴资格	是=1,否=0	0.163	0.370
地块数	单位：块	6.717	6.599
耕地质量	低=1,较低=2,中等=3,较高=4,高=5	3.231	0.817

解释变量	回归（1）		回归（2）		回归（3）		回归（4）
解释变量	系数	稳健标准误	系数	稳健标准误	系数	稳健标准误	系数	稳健标准误
亲缘社会网络	0.014**	0.006	0.015**	0.006	0.013*	0.007	—	—
友缘社会网络	—	—	—	—	—	—	-0.003	0.005
户主性别	0.134	0.231	0.032	0.226	0.221	0.275	0.119	0.229
户主年龄	0.008	0.005	0.008	0.005	0.010*	0.006	0.009*	0.005
户主受教育程度	0.027*	0.016	0.027*	0.016	0.028	0.018	0.027*	0.016
户主是否为村干部	-0.175	0.139	-0.202	0.136	-0.174	0.150	-0.156	0.138
户主是否兼业	0.019	0.121	-0.004	0.118	0.001	0.134	0.006	0.121
户主是否接受过技术培训	0.002	0.127	0.062	0.124	-0.043	0.140	0.012	0.126
户主是否具有粮豆轮作意愿	1.145***	0.132	1.227***	0.130	1.182***	0.136	1.135***	0.131
家庭经营规模	4.89E-04**	2.17E-04	0.001**	2.10E-04	3.32E-04	2.19E-04	0.001**	2.22E-04
家庭农业收入占比	0.045	0.08	0.071	0.079	0.087	0.088	0.053	0.08
家庭人口数	0.048	0.035	0.036	0.034	0.066*	0.038	0.056	0.035
是否参加专业合作组织	0.073	0.116	0.124	0.114	0.074	0.127	0.081	0.116
2017年是否享有粮豆轮作补贴资格	0.799***	0.132	—	—	—	—	0.806***	0.132
地块数	0.051***	0.010	0.051***	0.010	0.055***	0.011	0.051***	0.01
耕地质量	-0.049	0.056	-0.050	0.055	-0.015	0.060	-0.041	0.056
LR统计量	541.59***		502.30***		389.82***		537.12***
Pseudo R²	0.327		0.303		0.286		0.324

解释变量	回归系数	稳健标准误	解释变量	回归系数	稳健标准误
亲缘社会网络	0.005*	0.003	家庭经营规模	0.001**	2.18E-04
户主性别	0.098	0.230	家庭农业收入占比	0.045	0.080
户主年龄	0.009	0.005	家庭人口数	0.051	0.035
户主受教育程度	0.027*	0.016	是否参加合作社	0.082	0.116
户主是否为村干部	-0.180	0.139	2017年是否享有粮豆轮作补贴资格	0.799***	0.132
户主是否兼业	0.015	0.121	地块数	0.051***	0.010
户主是否接受过技术培训	-0.001	0.127	耕地质量	-0.048	0.056
户主是否具有粮豆轮作意愿	1.124***	0.131	常数项	-2.040***	0.465
LR统计量	539.61***		Pseudo R²	0.326

解释变量（有序Probit模型）	回归系数	稳健标准误	解释变量（泊松回归）	回归系数	稳健标准误
亲缘社会网络	0.009*	0.005	亲缘社会网络	0.009***	0.003
户主性别	-0.073	0.181	户主性别	-0.067	0.121
户主年龄	0.008*	0.004	户主年龄	0.006**	0.003
户主受教育程度	0.009	0.013	户主受教育程度	0.005	0.008
户主是否为村干部	-0.105	0.109	户主是否为村干部	-0.087	0.072
户主是否兼业	-0.005	0.096	户主是否兼业	0.022	0.061
户主是否接受过技术培训	0.054	0.097	户主是否接受过技术培训	0.009	0.059
户主是否具有粮豆轮作意愿	1.457***	0.114	户主是否具有粮豆轮作意愿	1.782***	0.132
家庭经营规模	1.49E-04*	7.90E-05	家庭经营规模	5.52E-05*	2.99E-05
家庭农业收入占比	0.109*	0.063	家庭农业收入占比	0.083**	0.038
家庭人口数	0.003	0.027	家庭人口数	-0.008	0.018
是否参加专业合作组织	0.037	0.093	是否参加专业合作组织	0.036	0.061
2017年是否享有粮豆轮作补贴资格	0.986***	0.096	2017年是否享有粮豆轮作补贴资格	0.523***	0.051
地块数	0.010**	0.005	地块数	0.005*	0.003
耕地质量	0.006	0.045	耕地质量	-0.017	0.029
LR统计量	742.43***		LR统计量	1123.25***
Pseudo R²	0.202		Pseudo R²	0.255

政府主导型生态补偿的多中心治理——基于农户社会网络的视角

Polycentric governance of government-led ecological compensation: Based on the perspective of farmers’ social network

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解释变量	边际系数	稳健标准误	解释变量	边际系数	稳健标准误
亲缘社会网络	0.003*	0.002	家庭经营规模	1.55E-05***	5.84E-05
户主性别	0.093*	0.057	家庭农业收入占比	0.016	0.02
户主年龄	0.003	0.001	家庭人口数	0.004	0.009
户主受教育程度	0.008**	0.004	是否参加专业合作组织	0.019	0.029
户主是否为村干部	-0.059	0.035	2017年是否享有粮豆轮作补贴资格	0.281***	0.033
户主是否兼业	0.028	0.031	地块数	0.015***	0.003
户主是否接受过技术培训	0.041	0.033	耕地质量	-0.014	0.014

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