资源开发过程中腐败的发生及制度影响

doi:10.18402/resci.2020.02.05

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

本文理论推导资源与腐败的关系并以中国省级数据进行经验检验。理论推演显示资源特殊性及资源收益是资源丰裕地区腐败的起点,但必须在资源收益分配制度不完善和资源管理存在自由裁量权的制度条件下才导致腐败,传导路径是“资源特殊性—资源收益—收益分配机制缺失—超额利润—经济寻租—政治寻租—自由裁量权—腐败”。经验检验使用1998—2017年省级年均截面数据和根据政治周期划分的短面板数据,量化资源开发、制度质量和腐败的关系,结果表明：资源开发单独不导致腐败,不考虑制度的调节效应,资源开发对腐败的影响小且不显著。加入制度和资源开发的交叉项后,资源开发对腐败的影响变得显著,但方向不确定;取中国各省份1998—2017年制度质量的均值,发现资源开发显著增加了腐败;但近20年中国各省份制度质量稳步提高,“资源腐败”大有改善。制度质量的阈值效应意味着只要区域制度质量提高到该阈值以上,资源丰裕地区即可避免“资源腐败”。另外制度质量并非资源诅咒的传导机制,即资源开发并没有降低制度质量进而“诅咒”区域发展。因此,资源丰裕地区治理腐败的关键是资源收益分配制度和资源管理制度的完善和创新。

关键词: 资源, 腐败, 发生机制, 制度质量, 中国

Abstract:

In this study, the relationship between natural resources and corruption is theoretically deduced and tested empirically with provincial data in China. Theoretical analysis shows that the particularities of natural resources and the inevitable resource benefits are the starting point of corruption in resource-rich regions, but corruption can only be caused by imperfect resource benefits management institutions and existence of discretion in natural resource management system. The specific mechanism is particularities-resource income-lack of benefits distribution mechanism-excess profits-economic rent-seeking-political rent-seeking-discretion-corruption. The empirical test quantifies the relationship between resource mining, institution quality, and corruption with 1998-2017 provincial average annual cross-sectional data and short panel data divided according to the political cycle. The results show three implications. Firstly natural resources development does not lead to corruption directly because the impact of resource development on corruption is small and insignificant. With the interaction terms of resources development and institution quality, the impact of resource development has become significant, but the direction is uncertain. That is there is a threshold for institution quality. If taking the average value of insitution quality of Chinese provinces from 1998 to 2017, the coefficients were significantly. As long as institution quality of regions are above the threshold, “resource corruption” in resource-rich regions can be avoided. In addition, institution quality is not a transmission channel of the resource curse. that is, the development of resources has not reduced institution quality and “cursed” regional development. Therefore, the key of corruption elimination in resource-rich regions is innovation and improvement of resource-related institutions.

Key words: natural resources, corruption, mechanism, institution quality, China

赵伟伟, 白永秀. 资源开发过程中腐败的发生及制度影响[J]. 资源科学, 2020, 42(2): 251-261.

ZHAO Weiwei, BAI Yongxiu. Corruption in the exploitation of natural resources and effect of institution[J]. Resources Science, 2020, 42(2): 251-261.

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变量	变量含义	均值	标准差	最小值	最大值
C	年均职务犯罪立案人数/人,取对数	6.98	0.93	4.03	8.29
R	采矿业工业总产值/亿元,取对数	3.68	1.50	-1.43	5.67
IQ	国有固定资产投资占全社会固定资产投资总额比重	0.38	0.11	0.23	0.78
P	非国有单位从业人员占全部从业人员比例	0.40	0.14	0.09	0.65
AGDP	人均地区生产总值/亿元,取对数	9.90	0.46	9.20	10.89
O	进出口总额占地区生产总值比例	0.30	0.36	0.05	1.27
FD	地方财政收入占地方财政总支出比例	0.51	0.19	0.08	0.87
G	城镇单位政府机关就业人数/人,取对数	12.64	0.69	11.13	0.65
E	6岁以上人口中大专及以上人数/万人,取对数	6.6	0.46	5.43	7.97
Ccase	年均职务犯罪立案数/件	1221.46	833.59	52.87	3610.00
pr	2012年人均公关招待费/万元	0.27	0.12	0.09	0.51
petition	1994—2012年信访接待记录数/人	9.65	3.07	3.8	18.8

	回归1（C）	回归2（C）	回归3（C）	回归4（C）	回归5（Ccase）	回归6（Pr）	回归7（petition）
R	0.467 0.002***	0.392 0.000***	0.055 0.447	0.019 0.786	0.030 0.641	-0.061 0.551	-0.089 0.163
IQ		3.380 0.000***		1.968 0.043**	2.199 0.017**	-0.961 0.532	-8385 0.183
AGDP			-0.398 0.241	-0.324 0.305	-0.355 0.231	-1.553 0.022**	-0.066 0.751
P			-2.433 0.044**	-1.960 0.084*	-0.782 0.448	-0.999 0.544	0.390 0.594
O			-1.071 0.009***	-0.784 0.048**	-0.786 0.034**	-0.515 0.359	-0.355 0.168
FD			0.642 0.581	0.557 0.648	0.592 0.604	4.931 0.01***	0.164 0.84
G			0.958 0.000***	1.001 0.000***	0.933 0.000***	-0.138 0.535	-0.076 0.459
E			-0.358 0.106	-0.342 0.098*	-0.230 0.225	0.334 0.493	0.521 0.001**
Prob > F	0.002***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.066*	0.000***
R²	0.569	0.729	0.916	0.931	0.912	0.456	0.735
回归方法	OLS+robust	OLS+robust	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
White test	0.000***	0.010***	0.415	0.415	0.415	0.414	0.415
VIF			6.710	7.120	7.120	7.720	7.120

因变量	回归1（C）	回归2（C）	回归3（Ccase）
R	0.062 0.325	0.016 0.783	-0.153 0.312
IQ		0.570 0.149	0.194 0.873
AGDP		-0.393 0.106	-0.194 0.473
P		-0.718 0.120	-0.636 0.328
O		-0.214 0.389	0.368 0.439
FD		0.015 0.966	0.337 0.354
G		0.008 0.895	0.052 0.481
E		-0.209 0.130	-0.007 0.951
Number of obs	101	101	94
Prob>F	0.000***	0.001***	0.090*
R²(组内)	0.453	0.374	0.425
Sigma_u	0.878	1.004	1.137
Sigma_e	0.176	1.172	0.325
rho	0.962	0.972	0.924
Test t1 t2 t3	0.000***	0.001*	0.318
Hausman test	0.001**	0.000***	0.000***

方程	因变量	R	AGDP	IQ	R×IQ	P	O	FD	G	E	Prob > F	R²	White test	VIF
式（2）	C	-0.339 0.048*	0.317 0.478	-5.018 0.004***	0.970 0.019**	-1.552 0.054*	-0.533 0.03**	1.326 0.231	1.026 0.000***	-0.249 0.447	0.000***	0.68	0.415	13.590
式（3）	IQ	0.019 0.320	0.037 0.598			-0.240 0.33	0.146 0.079*	0.609 0.02***	0.022 0.531	-0.008 0.856	0.000***	0.68	0.45	6.710