燃煤电厂环境污染第三方治理研究

doi:10.18402/resci.2019.02.11

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

作为中国环境治理思路由“谁污染谁治理”向“谁污染谁付费”转变的具体实施路径,环境污染第三方治理在雾霾防治等方面得到推广。针对政府如何制定切实可行政策鼓励燃煤电厂实现达标排放、燃煤电厂如何选择清洁发展路径方面存在的问题,以煤电行业烟气治理为研究对象,从绿色供应链的视角,分别构建在4种规制约束-政策激励下燃煤电厂采用自身投资运维、第三方治理2种模式的数学模型,并求解分析。结果显示：规制、激励政策同时实施能帮助燃煤电厂升级为绿色电厂;因提供较少补贴就能帮助燃煤电厂,政府更倾向根据第三方治理模式制定补贴政策;第三方治理模式还能在让燃煤电厂获得更多收益的同时,使传统环保企业转型为能够提供第三方治理的生产性服务企业而获得稳定收益,有助于“谁污染谁付费”思路在实践中的推广。最后,本文提出政府要加强环境约束政策执行、监督力度,给予精准激励政策,并出台鼓励提升环境绩效政策的建议。

关键词: 绿色供应链, 第三方治理, 环境污染, 规制约束, 政策激励, 环保补贴, 燃煤电厂

Abstract:

In China, coal-fired power plants still play a major role in the power sector, which is considered as a major emission source of air pollution, such as haze. Meanwhile, the concrete implementation path of the transformation of China’s environmental governance thinking from "who pollutes, who governs" to "who pollutes, who pays" is under way. Although the third party governance of environmental pollution has been popularized in air pollution prevention and control, there are also problems in existence. This study aims to take the flue gas control of coal-fired power industry as the research object. From the perspective of green supply chain, the mathematical models of coal-fired power plants using two modes of self-investment operation and third-party management under four kinds of regulatory constraints and policy incentives, including no subsidy, only electricity sales price subsidy, only extra sales volume ration of electricity are constructed, solved, and analyzed, respectively. Through the calculation and evaluation, the results show that: the simultaneous implementation of regulation and incentive policies can help coal-fired power plants upgrade to green power plants. Since less subsidies can help coal-fired power plants, the government is more inclined to formulate subsidy policies based on the third-party governance model. This model can also make more profits for coal-fired power plants and make the traditional environmental protection enterprises transform into productive service enterprises and obtain stable profits, which is helpful to popularize the idea of "who pollutes, who pays" in practice. As a green service provider, by devoting itself through innovating environmental technology to reduce pollutant emissions, the environmental protection enterprises can also assist the coal-fired power plants to gain additional sales volume of electricity and to maximize the supply chain’s profit as well. Therefore, it puts forward suggestions on strengthening the implementation and supervision of environmental restraint policies, giving precise incentive policies, and promulgating policies to encourage the improvement of environmental performance.

Key words: green supply chain, third party control, environmental pollution, government regulation, incentive policy, environmental subsidy, coal-fired power plants

黄华, 丁慧平. 燃煤电厂环境污染第三方治理研究[J]. 资源科学, 2019, 41(2): 326-337.

Hua HUANG, HuiPing DING. Environmental pollution control by a third party in coal-fired power plants[J]. Resources Science, 2019, 41(2): 326-337.

图/表 9

图1

表1

本文公式的参变量标识及含义"

参变量	参变量含义
$Q max$	燃煤电厂年最大上网电量
$R P U$	加装环保设施前,燃煤电厂年度累计利润
$Q t U$	加装环保设施前,燃煤电厂上网电量
$p U$	加装环保设施前,燃煤电厂上网电价
$c Pvt U$	加装环保设施前,燃煤电厂的生产经营成本
$f Pt U$	加装环保设施前,燃煤电厂的排污费
$Q ti a$	加装环保设施后,燃煤电厂获得的环保补贴电量
$E Pt E$	加装环保设施后,燃煤电厂单位发电量的污染物排放量
$NP V Pi I, NP V Pi E$	分别采用自身投资运维模式、第三方治理模式,燃煤电厂的净现值
$Δ C i I, Δ C i$	分别采用自身投资运维模式、第三方治理模式,燃煤电厂增加的成本
$p i Ia, p i a$	分别采用自身投资运维模式、第三方治理模式,燃煤电厂获得的环保补贴电价
$I P$	采用自身投资运维模式,燃煤电厂的初始投资
$c Pvt I$	采用自身投资运维模式,燃煤电厂的生产经营成本（含环保设施的运维成本）
$NP V Ei E$	采用第三方治理模式,环保服务企业的净现值
$NP V SCi$	采用第三方治理模式,绿色供应链的净现值
$I E$	采用第三方治理模式,环保服务企业的初始投资
$c Evt E$	采用第三方治理模式,环保服务企业的运营成本
$p i E$	采用第三方治理模式,燃煤电厂与环保服务企业协商确定的第三方治理服务价格
$Y$	环境容量
$t$	燃煤电厂经营年限
$t N$	实现盈亏平衡所需的年限
$α$	政府补贴系数
$r$	投资回报率
$β i$	环保服务费系数
$i$	$i = 1 、 2 、 3 、 4$ 分别代表无补贴、仅有补贴电量、仅有补贴电价、同时有补贴电量和补贴电价情况
$λ t$	拉格朗日乘子
$η$	采用自身投资运维模式,燃煤电厂增加的生产运营成本系数
δ1、δ2	贴现因子

表1

表2

燃煤电厂和环保企业初始投资及运维参数数据"

参变量	数值	参变量	数值	参变量	数值
$Q max$	66亿kW·h	$c Pv U$	0.302 0元/kW·h	$α$	0.3
$Q U$	50.064亿kW·h	$c Ev E$	0.015 0元/kW·h	$r$	12%
$Y$	1 583.4 t/年	$c Pv I$	0.321 5元/kW·h	$δ 1$	0.2
$E P E$	0.302 g/(kW·h)	$p U$	0.327 0元/kW·h	$δ 2$	0.1
$I E$	3.20亿元	$f P E$	0.009 7元/kW·h	$η$	1.3
$I P$	3.68亿元

表2

表3

无政府补贴情况下燃煤电厂分别选择自身投资运维和第三方治理模式的最优计算结果"

$t$	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
$NP V P 1 I *$ /万元	-34 342	-32 146	-30 187	-28 437	-26 874	-25 479	-24 234	-23 122	-22 129	-21 242	-20 450	-19 744	-19 113	-18 549	-18 046
$β 1 *$	1.252 9	1.252 9	1.252 9	1.252 9	1.252 9	1.252 9	1.252 9	1.252 9	1.252 9	1.252 9	1.252 9	1.252 9	1.252 9	1.054 4	1.054 4
$p 1 E *$ /（元/（kW·h））	0.025 0	0.025 0	0.025 0	0.025 0	0.025 0	0.025 0	0.025 0	0.025 0	0.025 0	0.025 0	0.025 0	0.025 0	0.025 0	0.015 8	0.015 8
$NP V P 1 E *$ /万元	20	38	55	69	82	93	104	113	121	128	135	141	146	1 087	1 927
$NP V E 1 E *$ /万元	-27 550	-23 577	-20 030	-16 863	-14 035	-11 510	-9 256	-7 243	-5 446	-3 841	-2 408	-1 129	13	97	171
$NP V SC 1 *$ /万元	-27 530	-23 539	-19 975	-16 794	-13 953	-11 417	-9 152	-7 130	-5 325	-3 713	-2 274	-988	159	1 183	2 098

表3

表4

仅有补贴电量情况下燃煤电厂分别选择自身投资运维和第三方治理模式的最优计算结果"

$t$	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
$Q 2 a *$ /亿kW·h	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	0	0
$NP V P 2 I *$ /万元	-34 224	-31 923	-29 869	-28 036	-26 398	-24 936	-23 631	-22 466	-21 425	-20 496	-19 667	-18 926	-18 265	-17 674
$β 2 *$	1.237 8	1.237 8	1.237 8	1.237 8	1.237 8	1.237 8	1.237 8	1.237 8	1.237 8	1.237 8	1.237 8	1.237 8	1.054 4	1.054 4
$p 2 E *$ /（元/（kW·h））	0.024 9	0.024 9	0.024 9	0.024 9	0.024 9	0.024 9	0.024 9	0.024 9	0.024 9	0.024 9	0.024 9	0.024 9	0.015 8	0.015 8
$N P V P 2 E *$ /万元	66	125	177	224	266	304	337	367	394	417	439	457	1 511	2 452
$NP V E 2 E *$ /万元	-27 382	-23 258	-19 576	-16 289	-13 354	-10 734	-8 394	-6 305	-4 439	-2 774	-1 287	41	134	218
$NP V SC 2 *$ /万元	-27 316	-23 133	-19 399	-16 065	-13 088	-10 430	-8 057	-5 938	-4 046	-2 357	-848	498	1 646	2 670

表4

表5

仅有补贴电价情况下燃煤电厂选择自身投资运维模式的最优计算结果"

$t$	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
$p 3 Ia *$ /（元/（kW·h））	0.003 8	0.003 8	0.003 8	0.003 8	0.003 8	0.003 8	0.003 8	0.003 8	0.0038	0.0038
$NP V P 3 I *$ /万元	-32 662	-28 968	-25 669	-22 724	-20 094	-17 747	-15 650	-13 779	-12 107	-10 615
$t$	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
$p 3 Ia *$ /（元/（kW·h））	0.003 8	0.003 8	0.003 8	0.003 8	0.003 8	0.003 8	0.003 8	0.003 8	0.003 8	0.003 8
$NP V P 3 I *$ /万元	-9 283	-8 093	-7 031	-6 083	-5 236	-4 481	-3 806	-3 203	-2 665	-2 184
$t$	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
$p 3 Ia *$ /（元/（kW·h））	0.003 8	0.003 8	0.003 8	0.003 8	0.003 8	0.003 8	0.003 8	0	0	0
$NP V P 3 I *$ /万元	-1 755	-1 372	-1 031	-725	-453	-209	8	123	226	318

表5

表6

仅有补贴电价情况下燃煤电厂选择第三方治理模式的最优计算结果"

$t$	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
$β 3 *$	1.194 0	1.194 0	1.194 0	1.194 0	1.194 0	1.194 0	1.054 4	1.054 4	1.054 4	1.054 4
$p 3 E *$ /（元/（kW·h））	0.030 6	0.030 6	0.030 6	0.030 6	0.030 6	0.030 6	0.015 8	0.015 8	0.015 8	0.015 8
$p 3 a *$ /（元/（kW·h））	0.006 3	0.006 3	0.006 3	0.006 3	0.006 3	0.006 3	0	0	0	0
$NP V P 3 E *$ /万元	290	550	781	988	1 172	1 337	3 417	5 274	6 932	8 412
$NP V E 3 E *$ /万元	-25 014	-18 776	-13 207	-8 234	-3 794	170	355	520	667	799
$NP V SC 3 *$ /万元	-24 723	-18 226	-12 426	-7 246	-2 622	1 507	3 772	5 794	7 599	9 211

表6

表7

同时有补贴电量和补贴电价情况下燃煤电厂选择自身投资运维模式的最优计算结果"

$t$	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
$Q 4 a *$ /亿kW·h	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4
$p 4 Ia *$ /（元/（kW·h））	0.004 0	0.004 0	0.004 0	0.004 0	0.004 0	0.004 0	0.004 0	0.004 0	0.004 0	0.004 0
$NP V P 4 I *$ /万元	-32 328	-28 335	-24 769	-21 586	-18 744	-16 206	-13 940	-11 917	-10 111	-8 498
$t$	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
$Q 4 a *$ /亿kW·h	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	0
$p 4 Ia *$ /（元/（kW·h））	0.004 0	0.004 0	0.004 0	0.004 0	0.004 0	0.004 0	0.004 0	0.004 0	0.004 0	0
$NP V P 4 I *$ /万元	-7 058	-5 772	-4 624	-3 599	-2 684	-1 867	-1 138	-486	95	394

表7

表8

同时有补贴电量和补贴电价情况下燃煤电厂选择第三方治理模式的最优计算结果"

$t$	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
$Q 4 a *$ /亿kW·h	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	0	0	0	0
$β 4 *$	1.191 1	1.191 1	1.191 1	1.191 1	1.191 1	1.191 1	1.054 4	1.054 4	1.054 4	1.054 4
$p 4 E *$ /（元/（kW·h））	0.030 0	0.030 0	0.030 0	0.030 0	0.030 0	0.030 0	0.015 8	0.015 8	0.015 8	0.015 8
$p 4 a *$ /（元/（kW·h））	0.006 1	0.006 1	0.006 1	0.006 1	0.006 1	0.006 1	0	0	0	0
$NP V P 4 E *$ /万元	518	981	1 395	1 764	2 093	2 388	4 467	6 324	7 982	9 463
$NP V E 4 E *$ /万元	-24 985	-18 721	-13 129	-8 136	-3 677	303	488	653	800	932
$NP V SC 4 *$ /万元	-24 466	-17 740	-11 734	-6 372	-1 584	2 691	4 955	6 977	8 783	10 395

表8

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