矿产资源开发收益合理共享机制研究——基于Shapley值修正算法的分析

doi:10.18402/resci.2018.03.18

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

近年来,矿产资源的开发和利用在推动中国经济发展的同时,也对生态环境造成了巨大的破坏。构建矿产资源开发收益分配机制时应考虑生态环境补偿问题。本文选择具体案例,从分析矿产资源开发各利益相关者的博弈行为出发,运用合作博弈的经典模型——Shapley值法对矿产资源开发收益分配问题作进一步分析求解,并引入“生态补偿因子”对Shapley值进行修正与优化。研究结果显示,Shapley值法对于建立更合理的矿产资源开发收益分配方式,达到社会经济效益最优、生态环境影响最小的目标,实现资源型地区的可持续发展,具有较强的现实意义和可操作性。

关键词: 矿产资源, 收益分配, Shapley值, 生态补偿因子

Abstract:

The development and utilization of mineral resources have promoted economic development in China and caused tremendous damage to the ecological environment. The issue of ecological compensation should be considered in the construction of revenue distribution mechanisms during mineral resource development. It analyzed stakeholders’ game behavior during mineral resource development through case studies and applied the classic model of cooperative game - Shapley value on revenues distribution of mineral resources development. By introducing an ecological compensation factor, the Shapley values are modified and optimized. According to the Shapley value, the revenues of the three stakeholders (government, company and local residents) have increased. The ecological compensation factor was introduced to modify the Shapley value, after that the revenues of the government and the company declined slightly while the income of local residents improved significantly, reflecting the fact that residents in the bauxite development who are facing geological disasters, environmental pollution, revenue reduction and other threats deserve greater compensation. The introduction of an ecological compensation factor to optimize revenue distribution during mineral resource development is not only in line with the principle of ‘he who makes investment gets benefit’, but also ‘the polluter pays and the beneficiary compensates’. The equilibrium solution is also an acceptable outcome for all stakeholders involved in bauxite development. The Shapley value method has strong practical significance for the establishment of a more reasonable mechanism of allocating revenue from mineral resources development, achieving the best social and economic benefits and minimizing impacts on the ecological environment.

Key words: mineral resource, revenue distribution, shapley value, ecological compensation factor

张艳芳. 矿产资源开发收益合理共享机制研究——基于Shapley值修正算法的分析[J]. 资源科学, 2018, 40(3): 645-653.

Yanfang ZHANG. Reasonable revenue distribution mechanism of mineral resource development based on modified shapley values[J]. Resources Science, 2018, 40(3): 645-653.

图/表 4

表1

中部某铝土矿开发中利益相关者1（政府）的Shapley收益值"

S₁	包含利益相关者1即政府的所有子集	$1$	$1 ? 2$	$1 ? 3$	$1 ? 2 ? 3$
v(S₁)	各子集收益	9.075	31.575	14.675	41.015
v(S₁-{1})	各子集中除去局中人1后的收益	0	22.500	1.600	27.940
v(S₁)-v(S₁-{1})	各子集中局中人1的收益	9.075	9.075	13.075	13.075
\|S₁\|	各子集中的元素个数	1	2	2	3
w(\|S₁\|)	权重	0.330	0.170	0.170	0.330
w(\|S₁\|)[v(S₁)-v(S₁-{1})]	考虑权重后各子集中局中人1的收益	3.030	1.510	2.180	4.360

表1

表2

中部某铝土矿开发中利益相关者2（矿企）的Shapley收益值"

S₂	包含利益相关者2即矿企的所有子集	2	$1 ? 2$	$2 ? 3$	$1 ? 2 ? 3$
v(S₂)	各子集收益	22.500	31.575	27.940	41.015
v(S₂-{2})	各子集中除去局中人2后的收益	0	9.075	1.600	14.675
v(S₂)-v(S₂-{2})	各子集中局中人2的收益	22.500	22.500	26.340	26.340
\|S₂\|	各子集中的元素个数	1	2	2	3
w(\|S₂\|)	权重	0.330	0.170	0.170	0.330
w(\|S₂\|)[v(S₂)-v(S₂-{2})]	考虑权重后各子集中局中人2的收益	7.500	3.750	4.390	8.780

表2

表3

中部某铝土矿开发中利益相关者3（村民）的Shapley收益值"

$S 3$	包含利益相关者3即村民的所有子集	$3$	$1 ? 3$	$2 ? 3$	$1 ? 2 ? 3$
$v (S 3)$	各子集收益	1.600	14.675	27.940	41.015
$v (S 3 - 3)$	各子集中除去局中人3后的收益	0	9.075	22.500	31.575
$v S 3 - v (S 3 - 3)$	各子集中局中人3的收益	1.600	5.600	5.440	9.440
$S 3$	各子集中的元素个数	1	2	2	3
$w (S 3)$	权重	0.330	0.170	0.170	0.330
$w (S 3) v S 3 - v (S 3 - 3)$	考虑权重后各子集中局中人3的收益	0.530	0.930	0.910	3.150

表3

表4

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	政府	矿企	村民
不合作收益	9.075	22.500	1.600
Shapley值	11.080	24.420	5.520
生态修正值	9.370	21.000	10.650
修正幅度	-1.710	-3.420	5.130